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ARTICLES

DEREGULATION AND LABOUR LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES
Samuel M. Kaynard*
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of
ownership ....

**

Deregulation is the mood of the day. Deregulation now in Labor
Law is not just a new and lively issue. It is about to become a
* A.B., College of the City of New York; J.D., New York University School of Law;

LL.M., (Labor Law), Georgetown University School of Law; Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law.
** National Labor Relations Act, 1935 Findings and Policies.
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reality.***
The response of the United States to the "inequality of bargaining power" was to intervene and to regulate the labor relations between employer, labor organization and employees by the enactment
of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act") in 1935.
The "inequality of bargaining power" which was the concern of
Congress was evident by the ofttimes tuibulent history of labor relations during the years prior to direct intervention of the federal government by the NLRA.
Today, fifty years later, after a period of relative accommodation between employers and unions, there is evidence of renewed turbulence on the labor management scene in the United States. It appears, not in the form of strikes, violence and confrontations of years
past, but in the call for a withdrawal of the federal government from
the industrial scene - deregulation. One form of deregulation is a
withdrawal by the federal government from the regulation of the economic aspects of industry and from direct involvement in the operations of private enterprises to permit the forces of free competition
and economic forces to operate - economic deregulation. Such economic deregulation will, undoubtedly, have some impact upon the
labor relations of the industries directly involved in the deregulation
and on other satellite industries affected by the deregulation.
The other form of deregulation is a change in the role of the
federal government in the establishment and the implementation of
the collective bargaining relationships between employers and unions
and employees

-

labor relations deregulation

-

a swing of the

"pendulum" from rules which some say have favored unions to a
position of "neutrality" to permit a free interplay between employers
and unions.
Both forms of deregulation impact upon the labor relations of
the nation and on the administration of the National Labor Relations Act.
DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR RELATIONS IN THE U.S.1

"The history of the American worker is the history of the
American Nation."12 Just as the nation enjoyed its good times and
***Former N.L.R.B. Chairman Edward Miller, Labor Law and Deregulation, BNA Labor Relations Yearbook (1981) at 165.
I. See, Silver and Kaynard, Labor Law, Confrontations and Agreements, Successes and
Failure,New York Law Journal, May 31, 1988 at 23 Col. 4, (Centennial Supplement). Sections of this paper are in part based upon this article.
2. W. Usery, The U.S. Department of Labor Bicentennial History of the American
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suffered through bad times, as it emerged from its agrarian beginnings to its current dominant position in the world of nations, so too,
labor relations experienced its highs and lows.
Efforts by unions and employees to secure better working conditions and redress date back to colonial times. In 1776, the Continental Congress met and the Declaration of Independence was signed in
Carpenters Hall in Philadelphia. The "pursuit of happiness" by employees and employers during the early years of the nation's history
included the formation of unions by employees; efforts by employees
and unions to improve working conditions; resistance at times and
agreement at times by employers; strikes; the embracement by the
courts of the doctrine of criminal conspiracy (a gift of the British
common law of the times), resulting in the imposition of fines and
imprisonment of strikers; the subsequent rejection of the doctrine
(which had persisted in the United States long after England had
departed from it) by the courts3 and the public." The growth of unions coincided with the growth and prosperity of the country and the
economic reversals. It saw the violent exploits of the Ancient Order
of Hibernians, popularly known as the Molly Maguires, in the anthracite regions of Pennsylvania; it saw the Chicago Haymarket Riot
of 1886.
Labor organizations became a part of the political, economic
and social scene of the United States. One of the most significant
developments was the founding, on December 8, 1886, of the American Federation of Labor ("AFL"). 5 Samuel Gompers, was elected
its President and led the organization for four decades.6 Gompers set
Worker, at 296 (1976) (U.S. Dept. of Labor History).
3. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met) 111 (1842). The decision by Chief Justice

Shaw is considered the turning point in the history of unions and labor relations in the United
States.
4. In 1835, a society of cordwainers in Geneva, New York, was prosecuted for conspiracy to raise wages. In 1836, when a society of tailors was found guilty of conspiracy, a mass

demonstration of 27,000 people saw the judge burned in effigy and the juries returned verdicts
of "not guilty." F.R. Dulles, Labor in America; A History at 65 (3rd ed. 1966).

5. For a short period of time, the labor scene was dominated, also, by the Order of the
Knights of Labor which admitted to membership all wage earners, small business people,
farmers, everybody except lawyers, bankers, stockbrokers, professional gamblers and anyone
involved in the sale of alcoholic beverages U.S. Dept. of Labor History, supra note 2, at 69-70

(quoting Herbert G. Gutman). Equally short lived was the emergence and disappearance of
the radical "class struggle" Industrial Workers of the World, known as the "Wobblies."
6. Mr. Gompers would have endeared himself to Prime Minister Churchill inasmuch as

cigars figured in both their lives. Gompers developed his "unionism" as a worker and activist
in the Cigar Makers Union; he started his career in the cigar-making shops of New York City
as a "reader" - a worker who read books, newspaper stories, poetry and magazine articles to
cigar workers to help break the monotony in the shop.
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the tone. When asked what labor wanted, Gompers replied, "More
and More" - a slogan frequently repeated by him.
Labor got more, but sometimes it got more than it bargained
for. It got increased membership; collective bargaining agreements;
successes; failures; strikes and violence. It got the pitched battle with
the Pinkertons in the barges at Carnegie's Homestead steel plant;
the disastrous Pullman Car railroad strike and the imprisonment of
Eugene V. Debs.7 It got the "Bread and Roses" strike and violent
confrontation in Lawrence, Massachusetts; 8 the "Ludlow Massacre"
near Ludlow, Colorado; "Bloody-Thursday," on Beacon Hill. It got
the Triangle Shirtwaist fire in New York City, where one hundred
forty-eight employees, almost all of them young women, died as
flames swept throughout the eight floors of the building or as they
jumped to their deaths, because the doors had been bolted to safeguard employers from loss of goods by the departure of workers.9 It
got "home industries," a euphemism for "home work" and "sweat
shops." It got, "If you don't come in on Sunday, don't come in on
Monday."
In addition, Labor got the "anti-trust" injunction and treble
damages which almost resulted in the seizure of the homes of 184
members of the Hatters Union in order to satisfy the award of
$252,130 against the Hatters Union in its strike and secondary boycott against Danbury Hat Company in Connecticut (the AFL later
proclaimed "Hatters Day" in which members of the AFL contributed an hour's pay to pay off the award). 10 The judiciary became a
dominant force in labor relations by the use of the injunction in la7. Debs later ran for President of the United States and received one million votes.
8.

When 20,000 workers, mostly women, went out on strike against the textile mills,

they carried banners, proclaiming, "We want Bread ... and Roses Too." The violent confrontation occurred in reaction to a technique adopted by the strikers; in order to alleviate the

hardship of the strike on the children of the strikers, sympathizers outside of Lawrence
"adopted" the children and when the children were about to be placed aboard the railroad cars
to leave Lawrence, there was a violent confrontation at the railroad station.
9. U.S. Dept. of Labor History, supra note 2, at 171, 217; Dulles, Labor in America: A
History, at 40 (3rd ed. 1966).

10.

Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), commonly referred to as the "Danbury Hat-

ters" case. Despite the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914, which some thought would exempt

unions from anti-trust, the Act was not so construed. See, Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).

The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982) outlawed "every ... combination ...
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states." 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982). The Clayton Act enacted in 1914 stated that "the labor of a human being is not a

commodity or article of commerce" and "no injunction shall be granted ... in any case between an employer and employees ... growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions
of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982). See also Dulles, supra note 9, at 197.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol6/iss1/1

4

Kaynard: Deregulation and Labour Law in the United States

1988]

Deregulation and Labour Law in the United States

bor disputes.
The Great Depression of the late 1920's and the stock crash of
1929 took their toll. By 1933, 12,830,000 persons were out of work,
about one-fourth of the urban labor force of over 51 million. The
American economy was in a chaos and American employees, employers and unions suffered.
It was during this period that the U.S. government started on

the road of regulating the labor relations of the country, establishing
a federal labor relations policy and fostering collective bargaining. In
1926, Congress passed the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") 1 which established rules for collective bargaining in the railroad industry; the
RLA was subsequently amended to cover the airline industry. In
1932, to address the abuses of the injunction in labor disputes, Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act.12 The Norris-LaGuardia
Act had a three-prong thrust on the labor picture. It severely limited
the power of the federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes; 13 it became the vehicle for the U.S. Supreme Court to severely
limit the applicability of the anti-trust doctrine to union activities
and, for a while, labor enjoyed its exemption; 14 it outlawed the "yellow dog" contract, a commitment signed by employee that he/she
would not join a union (called a "yellow dog" contract because, it is
said,1 5 only a yellow dog would sign such a contract).
11. Railway Labor Act 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
12. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982). See Frankfurter & Greene,
The Labor Injunction (1930).
13. Injunctions are still available in labor disputes in limited situations at the request of
the government under specific conditions, e.g., the National Labor Relations Act, (secondary
boycotts, jurisdictional disputes, recognition picketing, "hot cargo") see also §§ 10(e), 10(f),
10(h), 10(j) and 10(l) of the NLRA; national emergency injunctions; and in certain situations
at the behest of an employer, e.g., the "Boys Market" injunction - to enjoin a strike over an
arbitrable matter where the collective bargaining agreement provides for arbitration to resolve
the dispute. While the "Boys Market" injunction may be an anathema to labor, its use highlights one of the major characteristics of current collective bargaining, the use of arbitration as
a method for the peaceful resolution of disputes. Collective bargaining agreements, for the
most part, include no strike/no lockout provisions. The Supreme Court has endorsed arbitration by its decisions, which bolster and protect the arbitral process not only during the term of
the contract but after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. See Boys Market,
Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). Nolde Bros. Inc. v. Local 358
Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243 (1977). See also, infra pp. 46-49.
14. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); United States v. Hutcheson, 312
U.S. 219 (1941). But, union activities became and are subject to anti-trust in limited situations. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); United Mine Workers of
America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975), reh'g denied 423 U.S. 884.

15.

Mills,

LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

(2d ed. 1982) at 35.
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One of the responses to the Depression and the greatest catalyst
for the shaping of modern day labor relations and collective bargaining in the United States was the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA" or "Act"). 6 Enacted by Congress in 1935, it was a part
of the New Deal program 17 of President Roosevelt.
It is declared to be the policy of the United States . . . [to
encourage] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and
[to protect] the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection."8
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."' 9
Those declarations were and continue to be the cornerstones of
the federal labor policy for the private sector.20
16. National Labor Relations Act, ("NLRA") 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1935). The initial
roots of the NLRA first appeared in 1933 in the National Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA"),
which allowed industry to establish codes of "fair competition," fix prices and allocate production quotas without regard to the anti-trust laws. To offset those concessions to industry, the
NIRA gave labor Section 7(a) which guaranteed employees the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Dissension and attacks from all sides presaged the decline and doom of the NIRA,
finalized when the U.S. Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional. Efforts by Senator Robert
Wagner in 1934 and early 1935 during the decline culminated in the NLRA, coincided with
the final demise of the NIRA; the NIRA was declared unconstitutional in May 1935, President Roosevelt signed the NLRA on July 5, 1935.
17. The New Deal legislation sought to reverse the economic picture not only through
the collective bargaining process but by other legislation addressed directly to unemployment,
welfare, child labor and other issues. Federal Emergency Relief Administration was established to provide relief for the needy; Public Works Administration and Civil Works Administration were designed to put people to work on long term public projects, e.g., bridges, roads,
schools; Civilian Conservation Corp. was designed to put young people to work and preserve
and restore the land; Social Security Act provided unemployment insurance, old-age pensions;
Fair Labor Standards Act established a federal minimum wage (25 cents in 1939; 30 cents in
1940 and 45 cents in1945) and a norm of hours per week with overtime for hours worked in
excess of the norm; child labor laws.
18. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935).
19. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935). In 1947, Section 7 was amended to include "the
right to refrain from any and all such activities." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935), amended by the Act
of June 24, 1947, ch. 120, Title I, § 101, 61 Stat. 140.
20. The NLRA applies generally to employers in the private sector, but some employers
are excluded, e.g., railroads, airlines and religious schools. (In 1926, Congress had passed the
Railway Labor Act which laid down the guidelines for collective bargaining in the railroad
industry; subsequently it embraced the airline industry.) The Board in the exercise of its discretion, may also refuse to exercise jurisdiction over employers who do not meet certain mone-
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These mandates were implemented under the Act by (1) providing for elections among employees in an appropriate bargaining unit,
to afford them the opportunity to select, by majority vote, in a secret
election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board, which
labor organization, if any, they wished to have as their exclusive collective bargaining representative; and (2) declaring certain activities
by employers to be unfair labor practices and providing procedures
to remedy such unfair labor practices.
Thus, what had, in the past, been variously rejected, tolerated,
and fought over, namely the right of employees to join unions and
bargain collectively, was accepted in 1935, and declared by Congress
to be the law of the land.
The Wagner Act laid the groundwork for unprecedented organizational activities and the expansion of collective bargaining
throughout the country, sometimes accompanied again by confrontations, strikes, violence, and "sit-downs," in plants. By 1939, the AFL
membership exceeded 8 million; by the end of World War II, labor
membership increased to more than 14 million, 35.8 % of the nonagricultural employment, and there were collective bargaining agreements in most of the important industries and companies in the
United States, e.g., steel, auto, mine, men's clothing, women's garment, longshore, maritime, stage and screen.
The end of World War II brought on a rash of strikes as unions
sought to recoup the cut in take-home pay which resulted from wage
freezes during the war and aggravated by the changeover from war
to peace. With it also came a reaction against some union practices.
tary standards established by the Board. Some employees are also excluded from the Act and
by amendments, e.g., supervisors, spouse, or children of employers, agricultural laborers, do-

mestic workers. See NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2),(3) (1935). Other individuals have been
found not to be "employees" under the NLRA by the Board and courts, e.g., managerial

individuals, interns and residents, confidential employees, relatives and retirees. See, e.g.,
N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (church operated schools); Jewish Day School of Greater Washington, 283 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (1987) (religiously oriented

school operated by Lay directors); Universidad Cent. de Bayamon v. N.L.R.B., 793 F.2d 383
(1st Cir. 1986) (religiously affiliated university); Livingstone College, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 124

(1987); Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157
(1972) (retirees). N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974)

(managerial);

N.L.R.B. v. Action Automotive Inc., 469 U.S. 490 (1985) (relatives); N.L.R.B. v. Hendricks
County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981) ("confidential" employee with

"labor nexus"); Cedars Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976) (interns and residents); New York Racing Assn. v. N.L.R.B., 708 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1983) (horseracing). See
also Sure Tan Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (illegal aliens). The NLRA does not

cover the "public sector" employers or employees and the N.L.R.B. excludes from its jurisdiction private employers "controlled" by exempt public entity. See Res-Care, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B.
No. 78 (1986).
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In 1947, the Wagner Act was drastically amended by the LaborManagement Relations Act, referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act.
Opposed by labor as a "slave labor" act, it was nevertheless passed
by Congress, over the veto of President Truman. The Taft-Hartley
Act declared that certain activities and practices of labor organizations were "unfair labor practices," e.g., secondary boycotts, jurisdictional disputes. The closed shop authorization was replaced by a 30day union shop provision. Prestrike notices were required when the
parties were renegotiating or modifying a collective bargaining
agreement. The labor injunction was reactivated to a limited degree;
the N.L.R.B. could seek injunctions from the federal district courts
in certain situations and the Attorney General could seek injunctions
in a national emergency strike or lockout under specified procedures.
The reaction against unions continued into the 1950's, fueled by
the revelations of grave improprieties and abuses in the internal affairs of some unions which were disclosed in the hearings conducted
by the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or
Management Field, headed by Senator McClellan; a young Robert
F. Kennedy was its chief counsel. It led to the enactment of the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, designed to bring democracy to union affairs. It initiated federal supervision of internal affairs of unions,
particularly union elections and trusteeships; set forth a "bill of
rights" for members; and provided for financial disclosure requirements for union officials. Landrum-Griffin also amended the Wagner
Act and Taft-Hartley Act, "plugging some holes" in the secondary
boycott provisions; outlawing "hot cargo" agreements; and restricting recognitional and organizational picketing. The 1974 Health
Care amendments expanded the Board's jurisdiction to include
health care institutions and established pre-strike/lockout and prepicketing notices and procedures where health are institutions are
involved, in order to minimize the possible adverse impact upon patient care caused by strike or picketing.
Independent of the NLRA, Congress addressed the matter of
job and other discrimination by other legislation. Women's entry into
non-traditional occupations brought the demand of "Equal Pay for
Equal Work." In 1963, Congress passed the Equal Pay Act prohibiting wage discrimination because of sex. Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act prohibits employers, unions and employment agencies
from discriminating because of an individual's race, color, religion,
national origin or sex. And the Supreme Court has also reinterpreted
the 1866 Civil Rights Act to preclude employment discrimination on
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the basis of race.21 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, first
enacted in 1968, and subsequently amended in 1986, prohibits discrimination against those who reach the ripe old age of 40.22
REGULATION UNDER THE

NLRA

In the United States, it is, thus, clear that the federal government, to a great degree, regulates and fashions the labor relations
between the employer, the union and the employees. The nature and
extent of the federal intervention and regulation may vary; some aspects of the relationship may be subject to greater intervention and
regulation than others, particularly depending upon the applicability
of the NLRA or the RLA to the employer involved.
The NLRA closely regulates the establishment of the collective
bargaining relationship between the employer and the union. The
election procedure provides the mechanism to determine whether the
collective bargaining relationship shall come into existence, by providing for elections and ensuring "laboratory conditions" for the exercise of the franchise by the employees; it establishes, often, the
nature of the relationship, by determining the appropriate collective
bargaining unit, the scope and composition of the unit, e.g., whether
the unit shall be a single plant, multi-plant, multi-employer or craft
unit; whether certain individuals (supervisors, managerial individuals, etc.) are "employees" under the Act. In the unfair labor practice
proceedings, it may determine whether an employer has the obligation to recognize and bargain with a labor organization, without an
election, because the employer has destroyed "laboratory conditions"
and an election cannot be held;2" it determines whether a recognition
and bargaining obligation exists where there has been a sale of a
business, relocation, expansion, sale of assets, sale of stock, merger
or acquisition. 4
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1986). See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). On April
25, 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court voted (5 to 4) to hear argument in a pending case whether
the decision in Runyon v. McCrary should be reconsidered. Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988).
22. Other recent laws governing employment and the workplace include Occupational
Health and Safety Act of 1970 (amended in 1982 and 1985); Employment Retirement Income
Security Act; Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977; Davis-Bacon Act; Fair Labor
Standards Act (1938).
23. N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
24. See N.L.R.B. v. Burns Int'l Security Services, 107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987); Fall River
Dyeing & Finishing Corp. 107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987); Spruce-Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194
(1974); Spencer Foods, Inc. 268 N.L.R.B. 1483 (1984), enfd in part, den. in part 768 F.2d
1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Arundel Corp. 252 N.L.R.B. 397 (1980); Houston Division of Kroger
Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 388 (1975); Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Board, 417 U.S.
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While the NLRA does not establish the specific terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the collective bargaining representative, which is left to the "free" collective
bargaining between the parties, the Act has a decided impact upon
the nature of the final product, by denoting which subjects are
mandatory and which are permissive subjects of collective bargaining, which can be bargained to impasse and subject to economic
pressure of strikes or lockouts; by evaluating the actions of the parties to ensure "good faith" bargaining; by ruling on the demands for
information; by establishing the rules of the duty to bargain during
the term of the collective bargaining agreement; by laying down the
rules on the duty to bargain on managerial decisions to sell, relocate,
automate or subcontract. By determining when the bargaining between the parties has come to "impasse," the Act has an impact
upon the economic weapons to be brought to bear by employer or
union to resolve their differences, e.g., unilateral change of wages,
hours or working conditions. Similarly, under the NLRA, a party
desiring to modify or terminate a collective bargaining agreement
must give notice to the other party sixty days prior to the expiration
date of the collective bargaining agreement and must give notice to
the federal and state mediation services thirty days thereafter; failure to comply with such notice provisions renders the strike, lockout
or modification unlawful.25 In terms of the resort to the arsenal of
weapons, e.g., strike, lockout, picketing, the Act intervenes by its
rules relating to striker replacements, multi-employer bargaining,
secondary boycotts, picketing on private property, communications
and "free speech."
Where disputes and differences arise between the parties, subject to the NLRA, the Board does not act as a mediator or arbitrator. Of course, many of the disputes become the subject of Board
proceedings, and, in that capacity, the Agency contributes its services to the resolution of labor disputes, both formally and
informally.
The nature and degree of regulation and federal intervention in
labor relations under the NLRA may be high-lighted by a passing
249 (1974).
25. With respect to activities involving health care institutions, the notices to the parties
must be 90 days and the notices to the mediation services must be 60 days; where the bargaining is for an initial contract, there is an obligation to give 30 days notice to the mediation
services. In addition, there is an obligation by the labor organization to give 10 days notice to
the health care institution and to the federal mediation service prior to picketing or strike at
the health care institution.
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reference and comparison with the nature of intervention and regulation under the RLA and the nature of intervention under the British
System of labor relations.26
REGULATION UNDER THE

RLA

The RLA, as distinguished from the NLRA, establishes a
rather detailed machinery for the resolution of disputes between the
parties. All disputes involving grievances, or the interpretation or application of agreements, (referred to as "minor disputes" under the
RLA) must pursue established procedures for resolution by voluntary boards or by an administrative agency, the National Railroad
Adjustment Board; disputes over the formation or modification of
agreements ("major" disputes under the RLA) are subject to mediation by the National Mediation Board and may also become the subject of arbitration proceedings, if the parties agree. The RLA also
provides that major disputes not resolved by the process may be submitted to fact finding and recommendations by emergency boards
established by the President. Compliance with these procedures may
be subject to enforcement by the federal courts as an exception to
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus, under the RLA, the government,
in effect, can delay the strike by the union and preclude change of
the status quo by the carrier, by withholding the determination that
an impasse has occurred and by invoking these "virtually endless"2
dispute resolution processes. By comparison, under the NLRA, although there are some pre-strike notice requirements, the timing of
the strike is generally within the power of the union and, except for
national emergency situations and health care institution disputes,
delay and mediation is not within the control of the government.
REGULATION IN GREAT BRITAIN

In contrast to the American experience, labor relations in Great
Britain, 28 are fashioned, for the most part, by economic power,
26. For an analysis of the "interventionist" and abstentionist" character of the NLRA,
the RLA, and the English System of labor relations, see Arouca and Perritt, Transportation
Law and Policy For A DeregulatedIndustry, 1 Lab. Law 617 (1985). The authors classify the
statutes and labor relations as "interventionist" or "abstentionist." A low level of government
intervention is labelled "abstentionist," while a high degree of intervention is characterized as
"interventionist."
27. Burlington Northern v. B.M.W.E., 107 S. Ct. 1841, 1850 (1987).
28. For a detailed discussion of British labor relations and comparison with U.S. labor
relations, see Arouca & Perritt, supra note 26; IndustrialEncyclopedia For Labor Law and
Industrial Relations, Kluwer (1986), (Industrial Encyclopedia); Townshend-Smith, Labor
Law in Great Britainand America: The Similarity of the Underlying Themes, 9 GEO. MASON
U.L. REv. 245 (1987).
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rather than by law. Historically, this resulted from the limited
franchise during Britain's industrial revolution and from a mistrust
of the courts. 9 Unable to achieve its ends through the ballot, labor
resorted to its economic power. As a result, "multi-unionism" has
been sanctioned. Union recognition is, basically, left to the parties to
resolve. There is no obligation under law to make an employer bargain with a union or to compel a union to bargain with an employer.
Employers have no legally enforceable obligation to refrain from actions intended to discourage unionization, except for the unfair
dismissal.30
Once the collective bargaining relationship is established, the
collective bargaining agreement arrived at by the parties is openended rather than fixed; apparently, the parties may make new or
modify old decisions, on a continuing basis and problems tend to be
resolved on an "ad hoc" basis as they arise; the parties' agreements
are tentative, continually modifiable in whole or in part.31 Collective
agreements were not generally enforceable as legally binding contracts and the parties rely on economic power to secure observance
of their agreements. Historically, British unions enjoyed "immunities" against suits by employers against actions which interfere with
the employer's business.
In recent years, the extent of intervention in labor relations by
the British government varied from time to time as the political
power shifted between the Conservative Party and the Labour Party.
The Conservatives leaned toward regulation and the Labour government leaned toward permitting the interplay of economic pressures
by the parties. Thus, the Conservative government enacted the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, which was fashioned after the then
current Taft-Hartley Act in the United States. That statute included
provisions for the protection of the individual against abuse by union
power; regulation of union rules and members' rights; restrictions on
freedom to strike (unfair industrial practices); restrictions on closed
shops; right to be "non unionist"; presumption that collective agreements are legally enforceable as contracts; right to union recogniSee also, Martin Vranken, Deregulating the Employment Relationship: Current Trends in
Europe, Comparative Labor Law, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1986), at 158-164.
29. Arouca and Perritt, supra, note 26 at 620.
30. Britain has a comprehensive statutory scheme to protect employees against "unfair
dismissal." Virtually any employee who is dismissed has the right to an adjudication by an
administrative agency to determine whether his employer had just cause to dismiss him, with
reinstatement and damages as remedies.
31. Arouca and Perritt, supra, note 26, at 621.
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tion.32 The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 "was a spectacular failure"33 because it was based upon the mistaken assumption that
employers would use the law and that trade unions would cooperate
34
with it.
In 1974, the Labour party enacted the Trade Union and Labour
Relations Act ("TULRA"), and an amendment in 1976 which repealed and substantially modified many of the provisions of the 1971
Act and restored much of the old labour relations of Britain. It updated "immunity" for certain torts committed by persons in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute; restored and modified trade
union immunity from tort actions (later repealed in 1982); restored
immunity for peaceful picketing "i.c.f.t.d." (in contemplation/furtherance of a trade dispute) (narrowed in 1980); restored the presumption that collective agreements are not legally binding.
In 1980 and 1982, the Conservative government passed the Employment Act which attempted to curtail union power and modify
common law rights and "immunities." Those laws amended the 1974
TULRA and limited the labor immunity to picketing at the place of
work (the primary employer) and removed immunity from civil action for unlawful secondary activity; recognition procedures were repealed. In 1983, the Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations amended
Equal Pay Act 1970 to introduce equal pay for work of equal value
for men and women. The 1984 Trade Union Act laid down rules for
secret ballot for certain leadership positions in trade unions, secret
ballot confirming industrial action, and periodic ballots for maintenance of political fund and check-off regulations for political contributions. In 1986, Wage and Sex Discrimination were the subject of
legislative consideration. 5
Apparently, the British government, thus, plays only a small
role in regulating collective bargaining. No administrative agencies
supervise the selection of bargaining representatives or regulate unfair labor practices as under the NLRA. Disputes are resolved
through the use of economic power and common law suits in court,
but such suits are limited by certain "immunities" granted to labor
unions.
DEREGULATION

In the United States, in recent years, the federal government
32.

See supra, note 28.

33. Arouca & Perritt, supra note 26, at 622.
34. Industrial Encyclopedia, supra note 28.
35.

Id.
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has pursued a policy of less federal intervention, a policy of deregulation/privatization. 6 There have been varying degrees and kinds of
economic deregulation in certain industries, e.g., the transportation
industries, railroad, airline, and maritime, the banking industry, the
communications industry and the oil and natural gas industry. In the
transportation industry, the government withdrew or modified a long
standing regulation dealing with rates and routes of carriers; in the
banking industry, restrictions on the scope and nature of banking
operations were removed; in the communications industry, there was
a break-up of the control of the industry by AT&T, "Ma Bell."
Deregulation and privatization have not been limited to the
United States. Deregulation has reached into Russia and Poland;
private restaurants under private management, with the attendant
long lines as in the United States, have become a part of the scene in
Russia and Poland. 7 Canada decontrolled natural gas transactions
in 1986.8 In 1987, London Regional Transport announced plans to
sell LRT Bus Engineering ("REL"), its bus maintenance subsidiary,
to the private sector. The bus industry was deregulated in October
1986.31 In New Zealand, "a principal objective of the Labour Government's economic reform has been to roll back the frontiers of
state involvement in industry and commerce. 40 Japan moved to
break up its "Ma Bell."" 1 Italy, in 1987, looked with favor upon deregulation. 42 Thus, deregulation does not appear to have national or
36. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, February 10, 1985, § 3, at 1 ("All last week, in his budget
message, annual economic report and State of the Union address, President Reagan laid out

the game plan for his second term. He means to consolidate the conservative revolution in
public policy - he calls it a Second American Revolution - that he began four years ago. In
fact, the Reagan revolution, which he suggests is a reprise of George Washington's, is meant
to be the counterstroke of the Roosevelt revolution of the 1930's. Where Franklin Roosevelt

sought to overcome the problems of the Depression by increasing the economic and social role
of the Federal Government, Ronald Reagan has attacked "stag flation" - that combination of
stagnation and inflation that dogged the economy in the 1970's - by cutting the role of govern-

ment and by relying increasingly on what he calls "the magic of the market" to generate
strong economic growth.") Facts on File World News Digest, February 7, 1986, at 75 (President Reagan's annual economic report for 1986 "called for further government deregulation,
particularly in the nation's banking and agricultural sectors. The President also said in his
report that he had established 'a working group to investigate which government functions
could be effectively returned to the private sector.' The sale of government operations to pri-

vate investors was known as "privatization."
37. See N.Y. Times, October 10, 1987, at 43.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See Energy User News, (October 27, 1986).
Financial Times, July 11, 1987, § I (UK News), at 4.
Financial Times, July 23, 1987, (survey) at 5.
The N.Y. Times, January 8, 1984, § 3, at 8.
Financial Times, November 17, 1987, (survey) at 13.
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geographic boundaries.

a

IMPACT OF DEREGULATION OF INDUSTRY IN U.S.

Any assessment of the nature and impact of economic deregulation upon the labor relations that existed in industries prior to the
deregulation and an assessment of the nature of direct decisional deregulation of labor relations in the United States must be undertaken with a major caveat. "The future is seldom determined by a
single event. Therefore, it would be unrealistic to predict the future
of collective bargaining solely by an analysis of deregulation. The
aggregate effect of other presently unknown or unquantifiable factors
undoubtedly could control the ultimate resolution of this inquiry."'44
Professor Dunlop, who served as Secretary of Labor under President Gerald Ford, and who is currently a Professor at Harvard University, when asked to "assess the consequences of deregulation in
the transportation industries on their industrial relations" or to "help
to interpret developments that are expected to be engendered by deregulation in railroads, airlines, trucking or maritime and the changing interactions of managements, labor organizations and specialized
governmental agencies as a consequence," responded as follows: "All
reflection on the consequences of deregulation from models of economics and industrial relations or from the intuition of practitioners
needs to be discounted by the maxim that the unintended consequences of government regulation (or deregulation) are likely to
prove eventually the most significant. 45
43.

See Vranken, Deregulatingthe Employment Relationship: Current Trends in Eu-

rope, Comparative Labor Law, Vol. 7, no. 2 (1986), pp. 143-165.
44.

W. J. Curtin, The Future of Multi-Employer Bargainingin the TransportationIn-

dustries, in Transportation Labor Issues for the 1980's (May 17 & 18, 1972) (a seminar
conducted by Villanova Law School's Center for continuing Legal Education) [Hereinafter
"Transportation Labor Issues"]. See also Perritt, Aspects of Labor Laws That Affect Labor
Management Cooperation in the Railroad and Airline Industries, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Feb.
15, 1988; Assessment of Effects of Deregulation on Labor, (1984) Lab. Rel. Yearbook (BNA)

at 132-133; Deregulation Impact on Labor Management Relations (1979), Lab. Rel. Yearbook (BNA) at 132-133.
45. Dunlop, Deregulation and IndustrialRelations, Transportation Labor Issues, supra
note 44 at 12. Professor Dunlop further observed:

Deregulation not only alters competitive conditions in a product market for
transportation services but has consequences in upstream and downstream product
markets and in a variety of related factor markets. In transportation there are likely

to be major consequences in markets for equipment-trucks, airplanes, rolling stock
-

in the markets for specialized services and the extent of self service, as well as in

associated labor markets. The impacts are complex and ripple widely from the
center of the impact.

The industrial relations consequences of deregulation constitute a problem in
the analysis of the dynamics of an industrial relations system. Change an element of
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Notwithstanding these caveats, a great deal has been written
about deregulation of the transportation industry, before it took
place, when it came to pass, and an assessment of the experience
after a few years of such deregulation. Suffice it to say, there has
been no true consensus of what was supposed to happen and what in
fact happened in labor relations in this industry.
The same caveat and lack of predictability may be made where
the regulation and deregulation are directly involved with labor
relations.
In the airline industry, deregulation was set in motion in October 1978 with the enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act. The
airline industry was "cleared for takeoff"4 6 into a new environment
competition. "The blanket of a pervasive Federal government
[which had] served to warm all parties in the industry" 7 would be
removed; forty years of "maternal economic regulation"48 by the
Civil Aeronautics Board would be replaced by open competition.
The past ten years of deregulation in the airline industry has
brought a dramatic change in the industry and, in turn, affected labor relations in the industry. Deregulation prompted a surge of nonunion "upstart" airlines, many of which have not survived; 49 a wave
of mergers and acquisitions;50 takeovers; creation of holding companies; bankruptcies; "double-breasting" operations. With respect to
the airline labor relations, although "predictions of airlines labor
(and some carrier managements) of unmitigated disaster in the wake
an established system by a significant extent - technology, or competitor conditions
arising from international trade or government regulation - and then trace through
the dynamics -of adjustments in a congruent system. Id.
46.

Clearedfor Take Off- Airline Labor Relations Since Deregulation,Edited by Jean

T. McElvey, 1988, Introduction by Mark L. Kahn at 1. On June 16-18, 1987, The New York
State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University, The National Mediation
Board ("NMB") and The Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, jointly conducted a
national conference on airline labor relations since airline deregulation. Participants included
representatives and officials of major airlines, major airlines union, NMB, arbitratdrs and
economists with experience in the airline industry. The volume included some of the papers
presented at the conference.
47. Fowler, supra at 41.

48. Kahn, supra note 46, at 343.
49. Id. at 3.
50. Mergers and acquisitions included Carl Icahn-TWA, People Express- Frontier,
United-Pan Am Pacific, Texas Air-Eastern, TWA-Ozark, Texas Air-People Express, Northwest-Republic, Piedmont-Empire, People Express-Britt and PBA, Delta-Western, Alaska-Jet
America, American-Air California, Alaska-Horizon and USAir-PSA; three of these mergers
were approved by the Department of Transportation over the objections by the Department of
Justice because of the anti-trust problems. Kahn, supra note 46, at 4. See also, Cleared For

Take Off, supra note 46, part 3, Union Representation Following Mergers and Acquisitions, at
97-139.
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of deregulation have not come to pass," 51 the impact has been substantial and its full force is still uncertain. Thus, in 1980, Texas Air
Corporation, the holding company of Texas Airlines, created New
York Air as a separate, nonunion, low cost carrier and engaged in
"double-breasting," the operation of union and non-union carriers;
on September 24, 1983, Continental Airlines declared bankruptcy
under Chapter 11, abrogated its collective bargaining agreement, cut
its pay scales in half and resumed business on a non-union basis;
Braniff also declared bankruptcy and persuaded its unions to accept
lower wage rates in view of the actions at Continental. Another byproduct of the changes and instability in the airline industry resulting from deregulation was the disappearance of what used to be the
accepted "pattern settlements." "Time was when one could predict
mechanics' wage rates with reasonable certainty, on the basis of the
machinists' agreement with one of the major carriers whose contracts came up at roughly the same time. The same applied, to a
lesser extent, to agreements with pilots. Such guideposts are gone for
the time being."' 52 In sharp contrast with the national patterns established prior to deregulation, "negotiations became heavily enterpriseoriented and employee compensation became increasingly disparate
among carriers"; 53 carriers in financial difficulty pressed hard and
secured concessions through pay freezes and cuts and through
changes in work rules that reduced costs; and financially healthy carriers, also, pushed for lower pay wages for new hires (the two-tier
pay scale system) to meet the competition of other carriers and the
non-union "upstarts."5 Airline unions, on the other hand, in return,
demanded stock ownership, profit-sharing and other programs to offset the "give backs". Further, contract settlements included "recognition of the need for increased productivity in an era of reduced
stipends from the Federal treasury."5 5 Further, airline unions have
learned how to cope and counter the "traumatic changes" in the airline industry, in this world of takeovers and hostile acquisitions.
Thus, the unions intervened and prevented the effort of Texas Air to
take over TWA by helping Carl Icahn's acquisition; pilots of United,
unhappy with Allegis Corporation, the holding company, offered to
purchase United for $4.5 billion and contributed to the change in
51.

Fowler, supra, see also, Kahn, at 2.

52.
53.

Fowler, supra, at 41-42.
Kahn, supra note 46, at 4; See also Johnson, Trends in Pilots'Pay and Employment

Opportunities,Cleared For Take Off at 67-85.
54. Kahn, supra note 46, at 4.
55.

Fowler, supra, at 41-42.
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management; the controversy between the unions and Texas Air is a
continuing one."
Deregulation of the airline industry has also impacted upon the
structure of labor organizations. Some 30,000 airline workers have
lost their jobs since the 1978 Air Deregulation Act was passed. As a
result, labor unions have undertaken mergers "to improve the workers' positions in response to corporate reorganization
or takeover of
5' 7
their business by a large conglomerate.
Airline deregulation has changed the picture of labor relations
strikes by airline employees, strike replacements by airlines,
"crossovers" by airline employees (employees who do not initially
participate in the strike or who return to work during the strike) and
the internal rivalry for jobs between the "crossovers" and returning
strikers;" "secondary" activities, "sympathetic" strikes and threats
of such activities.58
The future course of labor relations in the deregulated airline
industry is somewhat uncertain. Management and unions agree that
deregulation has caused a great upheaval in the airline industry.
Labor representatives [stress] the hardships deregulation has
caused airline employees and [call] for a limited amount of regulation, for example: statutory imposition of labor protective provisions; management representatives [emphasize] the opportunities
created by deregulation for industry growth, higher employment,
and greater benefits to both shareholders and consumers. Every56. Kahn, supra note 46, at 4-6. The most recent manifestation of the ongoing dispute
between the unions and Texas Air is the strike by the machinists union (IAM) against Eastern
Airlines a division of Texas Air in February 1989 and the concurrent "sympathy" action by
the pilots' union (ALPA), resulting in Eastern Airlines filing for bankruptcy. See also The
Long Island Railroad Company v. IAM etc. (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Eastern Airlines v. Air Lines
Pilots Association (I Ith Cir. March 24, 1989) and (S.D. Fla., April 11, 1989).
57. Kilroy, supra note 44.
58. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants
("IFFA")

-

U.S.

-

- L.R.R.M. (BNA)

.- ,

57 U.S.L.W. 4283 (Feb. 28, 1989), (em-

ployer is not required by RLA to lay off junior crossover employees in order to reinstate more
senior full-term strikers at the conclusion of a strike upon their application for reinstatement).
See also, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants, 809 F.2d
483 (8th Cir. 1987), affirmed by an equally divided of U.S. Sup. Ct.; petition for rehearing
denied (union security and dues check off provisions in collective bargaining agreement remain
in effect during strike after impasse). IFFA v. T.W.A., Inc. (W.D. Mo. March 9, 1988) ("bad
faith" bargaining). See also supra, note 56 and infra note 79. Note that in August 1981, the
air traffic controllers, employed by the federal government, engaged in a strike; the federal
government discharged the strikers for violating the federal "no strike" law and the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Association (PATCO) which was the collective bargaining representative of the air traffic controllers and which called the strike was subsequently disbanded.
See also, Cleared For Take Off, op at supra note 46, Part 5, Handling of Major Disputes, pp.
185-251.
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body calls for more cooperation and less confrontation in labor
management relations; but . . . the new era of good feeling is not
yet a realistic possibility except in a few individual cases.'9

Some believe that the results of deregulation in 'the
airline industry
"will soon lead to a large dose of re-regulation. 60
The impact on labor relations as a result of deregulation in the
airline industry has been mirrored to some degree in other industries
subjected to deregulation such as trucking and communications, as
shown by the emergence of non-union companies, double-breasted
operations, mergers, acquisitions, concession and "give-back" bargaining negotiations.
Deregulation of the transportation industry has resulted in
greater competition within the various parts of the industry and between and among the different modes of transportation. New companies have entered the field, some of which are non-union, and thus
competition has increased within the trucking industry.
It has been predicted6" that there will be increased merger activity; increased competition and expansion into high-profit markets;
abandonment of marginal or unprofitable operations; increase in new
entrants, many of which will fill the voids left by the abandonment
of unprofitable or marginal operations; and increase in bankruptcies.
In turn, collective bargaining will reflect these influences and result
in wage restraint; increased emphasis on productivity; pressure for
concessionary relief for individual carriers in financial difficulty; erosion of Industry-wide Bargaining and Pattern Settlements; and increased emphasis on job security.
One of the questions raised by the deregulation of the trucking
industry is the possible impact upon the past pattern of bargaining
on a national basis. Labor relations in the trucking industry developed, as the trucking industry developed - local, to regional, to national carriers with collective bargaining agreements corresponding
to the geographical developments. National agreements continued
regularly throughout the 1960's and 1970's.
Although the entry of more trucking companies in competition
with the established companies in the trucking industry resulted
from deregulation and somewhat weakened the power of the Teamsters Union in its dealing with the industry, it has been predicted
59.

Cleared For Take-off, supra note 46, at x-xi.

60.

Kahn, supra note 46, at 7.

61.

Zeh, The Future of Craft Structure, supra note 44, at 147, 180-181, (for an exposi-

tion of predictions of impact on the transportation industry).
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that -"although the economic forces intensified by deregulation are
having a dramatic impact on the industry and a discernible impact
on short-term bargaining goals, they are not likely to undermine the
structure of multi-employer bargaining in the railroad or trucking
sectors in the near future."62
Deregulation in the trucking industry, combined with other economic difficulties, produced a Master Freight agreement in 1982 of
"historic dimensions." The agreement was "negotiated and ratified a
month before the old agreement expired, and provided for no wage
adjustments other than annual cost-of-living increases .... "963
The 1988 National Master Freight Agreement 4 similarly reflected the new approach to labor negotiations. The Teamsters announced its ratification, despite disapproval by about 64% of the
rank-and-file membership, on the ground that it was compelled to
accept the agreement under a constitutional rule which required twothirds vote to reject, and a strike, the Teamsters International declared, would be improper. The minimum wage increase over the
three-year life of the contract is approximately 10%.
In the communications industry, the "deregulation" has come
about, not by statutory or administrative rulings as in the transportation industry, but rather as a result of antitrust litigation and divestiture and breakup of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company ("AT&T") in 1984. Divestiture will materially affect the
nature of collective bargaining. In the past, bargaining was conducted on a nationwide basis, with an opportunity for the various
regions to negotiate on "local" matters after the national pattern was
established. This also resulted in the power residing with the International CWA, which conducted the national negotiations and not
with the local unions. Although the CWA will try.to approximate
national bargaining as close as possible, the best it can hope for is
bargaining for eight contracts - one with AT&T and additional
contracts with each of the seven new regional Bell System companies. Without uniform bargaining structure, many contract provisions will grow dissimilar.65 This, in turn, will also reduce the power
of the International; power will now reside at the local and regional
union levels. The CWA will restructure itself and tailor itself to the
structure of the new AT&T and the seven regional operating compa62.
63.
64.
65.

Curtin, supra note 44, at 395-96.
Fowler, Government and Union Policies for the Future, supra note 44, at 51.
98 BNA Lab. Rep. (May 20, 1988).
Assessment of Effects of Deregulation on Labor, supra note 44, at 132-33.
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nies.66 The number of jobs in the telecommunications industry has
plummeted since AT&T deregulated. It is asserted that more than
53,000 jobs in the regional holding companies have been eliminated
since divestiture, and 87,000 jobs have been lost in AT&T.67 The

loss of jobs and reduction of membership will, of course, affect the
collective bargaining between the parties.

Apart from the impact which deregulation of industry will have
on the established collective bargaining relationships in the various
industries, it is clear that deregulation will result in the entry of new
companies in the industry and resultant competition. In turn this will
undoubtedly increase the number of labor disputes in connection
with organizing campaigns and labor disputes when employers, faced
with such competition, will seek to gain labor cost advantages in

dealing with their collective bargaining representatives, with the possibility of strikes and the attendant repercussions and problems. Re-

sulting in instances of secondary activity and "double breasting" by
established unionized employers trying to meet the competition. All
of which will undoubtedly result in activity under the NLRA and
the RLA. Representation election proceedings"8 and unfair labor
practice proceedings under the NLRA 6 would present issues inter
alia of obligation to bargain with and status of existing collective
bargaining agreements of incumbent unions; successorship; scope of
unit; discrimination;70 accretion;71 status of double-breasting operations; 72 duty to bargain over "management" decisions e.g., to close,
relocate, subcontract, lay off;73 unfair labor practice proceedings
66. CWA's Forty-Sixth Annual Convention, Lab. Rel. Yearbook (BNA) 277 (1984).
67. BNA Daily Rep., June 23, 1988.
68. Section 9 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159.
69. Sections 8 and 10 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 160.
70. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc. 406 U.S. 272 (1972); Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board, 417 U.S. 249 (1974); N.L.R.B. v.
Fall River Dyeing 107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987); Golden State Bottling Co. v. N.L.R.B., 414 U.S.
168 (1973).
71. See e.g., Arundel Corporation, 252 N.L.R.B. 397 (1980), Houston Division of Kroger Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 388 (1975).
72. See, e.g., A-1 Fire Protection, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 464 (1984), on remandfrom sub
nom Plumbers Local 669 v. N.L.R.B., 676 F.2d 826 (D.C.C.A. 1982), supplementing 250
N.L.R.B. 217 (1980), enfd 789 F.2d 9 (D.C.C.A. 1986); Walter N. Yoder & Sons, Inc. 270
N.L.R.B. 652 (1984), enf'd 754 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1985). South Prairie Construction Co. v.
Local No. 627, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 425 U.S. 800 (1976).
73. See, e.g. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (subcontracting); First National Maintenance Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (partial
closings); Parma Industries, Inc., 292 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (1989) (plant closing); Otis Elevator
Company, 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) (relocation); Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil
Spring Company, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), aff'd 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (relocation);
Lapeer Foundry and Machine Inc. 289 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (1988) (layoffs), Litton Financial
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before the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts
involving the organizational and recognitional picketing provisions of
Section 8(b)(7), under the secondary boycott provisions of Section
8(b)(4),5 and under the hot cargo provisions of Section 8(e). 6 Plant
Printing Division, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (layoffs); Otis Elevator Company, 283 N.L.R.B. No.
40 (1987) (effects of relocation).
74. Section 8(b)(7) [29 U.S.C.A. § 158] states, in part, that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization
to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed,
any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees, or
forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor
organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees:
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section
9(c) [section 159(c) of this title] being filed within a reasonable period of time not
to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided. That
when such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the
provisions of section 159 (c)(1) or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest
on the part of the labor organization, direct an election in such unit as the Board
finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results thereof: Providedfunher. That
nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or
other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor
organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed
by any other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or
transport any goods or not to perform any services.
75. Section 8(b)(4) states, in part, that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a
strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an
object thereof is (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring
any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the
representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9....
76. Section 8(e) states, in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to
cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered
into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent
unenforceable and void .

. ..
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closings and mass lay offs, should they occur, will present issues
under the recently enacted Worker Adjustment Retraining Notifica-

tion Act ("WARN"). 7
Competition will also generate changes in the nature of bargain-

ing (i.e., "give backs," "hard bargaining") and, in turn, generate
charges under the NLRA and the RLA. 8
Deregulation of the railroads and airlines has revived the perennial question - should the railroads and airlines continue to be gov79
erned by the RLA or should the RLA be merged into the NLRA.
DEREGULATION OF THE

NLRA

Over the years, from the day of its passage to this very day,

there has been criticism of the Board in its operations and in its
decisions. Criticism has come from both of the major contestants employers and unions - joined often by Congress and neutrals. But,
none have been so vitriolic as those of recent years.
Labor spokespersons assert that the current Board is reversing
decisions of previous Boards in favor of management."0 AFL-CIO
Secretary Tom Donahue declared the Act, as currently administered, "an abject and utter failure."81 Lawrence J. Cohen compared
the Board to a vessel which
77. P.L. No. 100-379, 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 2101-09 (Supp. 1988).
78. For example, the strike by the flight attendants against TWA has generated multiple
litigation under the RLA before the U.S. District Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals and the
U.S. Supreme Court. The litigation has raised important issues, e.g., the relative rights of
strike replacements, "crossovers," and strikers who offer to return to work; which contract
provisions survive the expiration of the collective baigaining agreement; the status of the union
security provision after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement; allegations of
bad faith bargaining. See, supra notes 56, 58.
79. In view of the possibility of secondary boycott activity as a result of the deregulation
of railroads and airlines, it is important to note that there are important differences between
the RLA and the NLRA with respect to the treatment of secondary boycotts and injunctions.
See Burlington No. Rwy. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S.
429 (1987).
80. See, e.g., Page, The Rise, Decline and Resurrection of American Labor Law: A
Critical Assessment of the NLRA at Age Fifty, 36 Lab. L. J. 594 (1985). For examples of
reversals of precedent by the recent Board, see Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1984)
aff'd 760 F.2d 1006 (1985); Meyers Industries, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, revd 755 F.2d 941
(1984); Taracorp Industries, 273 N.L.R.B. 221 (1984); Gourmet Foods, Inc. 270 N.L.R.B.
578 (1984); Midland National Life Insurance Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982); Milwaukee
Spring Div. of Illinois Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), aff'd 765 F.2d 175 (1985);
Indianapolis Power and Light Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1715, (1985) rev'd 797 F.2d 1027 (1986);
Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984); United Technologies Corp. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984);
Independent Stave Co., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1987); Our Way, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 76
Buckley Broadcasting Corporation of California, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 113 (1987).
81. Current Developments section, Donahue calls NLRA - 'Utter Failure'and says reforms will come in time, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 142 (July 24, 1985).
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has been taken over by pirates who are methodically scuttling the
Act which they are charged to protect. This Board has ... man-

aged, in little over one year, to turn the state of labor relations in
the country back 50 years, for its actions encourage a return to
economic warfare, rather than the peaceful resolution of disputes
through bargaining and through the Board. 2
Defenders of the Board counter with the declaration that the
current Board is not really reversing decisions, but rather reinstating
prior decisions of long standing which prior Boards had imprudently
reversed. Former N.L.R.B. General Counsel Peter Nash hailed recent Board reversals as a "return to sanity." 83 Former Board Chairman Edward Miller asserted that only a few precedents have been
altered by the Board and that these reversals make little difference
in the world of labor relations the new conservatives are acting about as we would have expected
them to do and are changing some precedents out on the fringes of
the law, but what they're doing out there has little or no impact on
the realities of industrial relations. They make interesting commentary for law reviews."
Congress and "neutrals" joined the fray. Several years ago, a
majority of the House Labor Committee issued a report "Failure of
Labor Law - A Betrayal of American Workers;" the minority on the
subcommittee issued a counterstatement, characterized the majority
report as "overstatement, overdramatization, and . . . hyperbolic

rhetoric." Judge Mikva observed that "union members believe the
NLRA provides inadequate protection when they confront manage' Professor Clyde Summers declared, "the legal rules develment."85
oped by the Board and the courts do not express or implement the
premises and purposes of the Act." 86
There has been clamor for change - deregulation of labor relations. Some suggest outright repeal of the NLRA;87 some suggest
82.
83.
(1984).
84.
85.
38 STAN.
86.

Southwestern Legal Foundation Institute, Lab. Rel. Y.B. (BNA) 159 (1984).
Rule Making as Aid in N.L.R.B. Policy Reversals, Lab. Rel. Y.B. (BNA) 142

Southwestern Legal Foundation Institute, Lab. Rel. Y.B. (BNA) 159 (1984).
Mikva, The Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor Movement,
L. REV. 1123, 1124 (1986).
Summers, Past Premises, Present Failures and Future Needs in Labor Legislation
31 BUFFALO L. REv. 9, 17 (1982).
87. Dunlop, Deregulation of Labor Relations from N.L.R.B., (BNA) Lab. Rel. Y.B.
(1983), at 56 ("It is time to deregulate labor relations from the control of the N.L.R.B. and
the courts.") See also, Miller, Labor Law and Deregulation, BNA, Lab. Rel. Y.B. (BNA) 160

(1981).
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procedural changes of the Act to expedite the processing of cases
and to reduce the backlog; some suggest certain types of cases be

withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Board and the Act;8 8 some
suggest the transfer of unfair labor practice cases to the federal dis-

trict courts, or creation of new Labor Courts.89
A call has been issued for a "tripartite, private sector conference, attended by representatives of labor, management and government be held ...[to] discuss a wide variety of possible changes." 9
Most of the suggestions would require legislative action. There

have been no statutory changes of the NLRA since 1959 (except for
the limited health care amendments in 1974). The one recent effort
to change the NLRA by the Labor Reform Bill in 1978 was a disaster. However, the lack of statutory change does not mean that there
has been "no change." Changes have been reflected by the decisions

of the NLRA.91 Decision making deregulation, to some degree, has
taken the place of statutory deregulation of the NLRA.

Recent decisions of the Board reflect the philosophy of deregulation - a policy of less involvement of the federal government in
the labor relations of the employer and the labor organizations, an
approach to labor relations to let management and labor resolve
88. See Miller supra note 87, at 160-6. ("One of the areas in which the Board's regulation through decision making seems to me singularly ineffective and not very necessary is that
of regulating the conduct of parties who already have a mature relationship." Id. at 160. "Is
there really any public interest to be served by the Board's carefully reviewing the discharge
and discipline of union officers and stewards who take part in a wild cat strike?" Id. at 161.
"[Is it] really useful to have the Board monitor the bargaining process and decide whether
companies or unions have 'bargained in good faith.'" Id. "Couldn't equal employment regulation be centralized in one place and . . . remove that jurisdiction from the National Labor
Relations Board." Id. at 165. "[I] wonder whether we need an administrative agency to regulate [secondary boycotts] or whether we could simply leave the enforcement of that area to
private actions under Section 303 ... and expand Section 303 to permit the courts to issue
injunctions as well as awards of damages in appropriate cases." Id. "The Board could also
simplify its regulatory role and reduce the need for elaborate hearings and case-by-case decision making in representation cases if it would engage in rule-making." Id. at 162. "I have
earlier suggested that when the General Counsel issues a complaint it ought to be brought
directly before a federal district court judge, rather than before one of the Board's Administrative Law Judges. Amend the law to provide for prompt enforcement or review of Administrative Law Judges' decisions in the local federal district courts, rather than passing them all by
the N.L.R.B. in Washington and then on to a United States Court of Appeals." Id. at 164).
89. See, e.g., Bartosic, Labor Law Reform - The N.L.R.B. and a Labor Law Court, 4
GA. L. REV. 647-8 (1970); Morris, A Case for Unitary Enforcement of Federal Labor Law
Concerning A Specialized 4rticle III Court and the Reorganization of Existing Agencies, 26
SW L. J. 477 (1972); Farmer, Transfer of N.L.R.B. JurisdictionOver Unfair Labor Practices
to Labor Courts? 88 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1985).
90. Silver and McAvoy, The National Labor Relations Act At The Crossroads, 55
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 181.
91. See supra note 80.
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their differences through their own actions and procedures, and, if
need be, their economic powers.
A review of some recent decisions demonstrates that, in fact,
there has been some "deregulation" of the NLRA by Board decisions in some very important areas of labor relations. For example,
what can an employer say in the pre-election campaign; must an employer bargain about his decision to shut down part of his operation;
can an employer relocate his plant or part of its operations during
the term of the collective bargaining agreement; must an employer
bargain about such decision to relocate; does a no-strike provision
include a sympathy strike; can an employer who engages in an economic offensive lockout hire temporary replacements; when can an
arbitration of a dispute between the employer and the union/employee foreclose an unfair labor practice proceeding; can there be a
settlement of an unfair labor practice over the objection of the general counsel or the charging party, can an employer keep the union
off its property.
PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN
In carrying out its duties and responsibilities to afford employees the opportunity to select or reject a labor organization as their
collective bargaining representative through the election process, the
Board has zealously undertaken to ensure laboratory conditions and
an informed electorate, so that the results of the ballot reflect a free
and fair choice on the part of the employees. In seeking to establish
such a climate, the Board has been called upon to assess the
speeches and other pre-election propaganda of the parties to determine whether they constituted threats, coercion or promises of benefits and exceeded the bounds of free speech.
In addition, the Board, in the past, undertook to regulate the
pre-election campaign by setting aside an election "where there has
been a misrepresentation or other similar campaign trickery, which
involves a substantial departure from the truth, at a time which prevents the other party or parties from making an effective reply, so
that the misrepresentation, whether deliberate or not, may reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the election." 92 Over
the years, the Board has rejected and reinstated this Hollywood Ceramics doctrine. 93 Finally, for the second time in 1982, the Board
92. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224 (1962).
93. See e.g., Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1971); General Knit of
Calif. Inc. 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
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overruled Hollywood Ceramics. Regarding employees as mature individuals who are capable of recognizing campaign propaganda for
into
what it is and discounting it, the Board "will no longer9' probe
4
the truth or falsity of the parties' campaign statements.
Management Decisions-Total/PartialPlant Shutdown; Relocation;
Subcontracting; and Layoffs
The NLRA prohibits, in clear and unequivocal language, "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
' (e.g. discharging an employee for joining
any labor organization,"95
or assisting a labor organization). Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme
Court has unequivocally declared that an employer may close down
his entire business even if such closing and liquidation "is motivated
by vindictiveness toward the Union," even if such action is
"prompted by a desire to avoid unionization."9 6 "A proposition that
a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants
to would represent such a startling innovation that it should not be
entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or
unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor Relations
Act. We find neither. 97 However, if the employer has several plants,
his closing of one plant (a "partial closing") for anti-union reasons is
an unfair labor practice if motivated by a purpose to chill unionism
in any of the remaining plants of the employer and it may reasonably be foreseen that the closing would have that effect. 98 Similarly,
as distinguished from the finality of a plant shutdown and liquidation which completely terminates the employment relationship, the
"runaway shop," relocation of a plant, opening of a new-plant, transfer of work to another plant or to other employees in the same plant
or to an alter-ego corporation, or subcontracting the work to another
company to avoid or retaliate against union activity is distinguisha94. Midland National Life Insurance Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 132 (1982). See also Affiliated Midwest Hosp., d/b/a Riveridge Hosp., 264 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1982), enfd 789 F.2d 542

(7th Cir. 1986) (misrepresentations concerning Board processes and actions, overruling Form
Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 61 (1977)).

95. NLRA, § 8(a)(3).
96. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co. 380 U.S. 263 (1965). Note, however,
the Supreme Court's caveat: "nothing we have said in this opinion would justify an employer
interfering with employee organizational activities by threatening to close his plant, as distinguished from announcing a decision to close already reached" by him. Id. at fn. 20 at 274.

97. Id. at 270.
98. Id. See also Darlington Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 397 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1968) cert.
denied 393 U.S. 1023 (1969); First National Maintenance Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666,
682 (1981).
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ble from Darlington and constitutes an unfair labor practice.99
Turning to management decisions and actions which are not
motivated by anti-union considerations, but by economic or other
considerations, what limitations or obligations are there on the part
of the employer under the NLRA. When management and labor
enter into the collective bargaining relationship, the NLRA lays
down some rules governing the relationship, obligations, and freedom
of action of the parties. Thus, it is clear that an employer is obligated to bargain with the collective bargaining representative with
respect to the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, such as,
"wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment." 100 In
addition, the employer generally may not unilaterally change those
conditions before reaching a good faith impasse in bargaining. 101
Further, when there is a collective bargaining agreement in effect, an
employer who seeks to modify a term or condition "contained" in the
collective bargaining agreement must not only bargain with respect
to that change, but must obtain the union's consent before implementing the change.1"2
Issues arise, however, in determining what obligations attach to
certain particular actions of an employer which are referred to as
"managerial" decisions (e.g. subcontracting, closing of a business in
whole or in part, plant relocation, subcontracting, layoffs, etc;
whether the existing bargaining contract precludes such action;
whether such action may be taken after impasse and when is there
an impasse).
The U.S. Supreme Court, when recently confronted with the issue of whether an employer was obligated to bargain with the recognized collective bargaining representative concerning a management
decision to shut down part of its business, made some interesting and
telling observations. "[I]n establishing what issues must be submitted to the process of bargaining, Congress had no expectation that
the elected union representative would become an equal partner in
99. See, e.g., Garwin Corp. 153 N.L.R.B. 664 (1965), enfd 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert denied 387 U.S. 942 (1967), rem'd, 169 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1968), enfd 374 F.2d 295
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 980 (1969); N.L.R.B. v. Rapid Bindery, Inc. 293 F.2d
170 (2d Cir. 1960); Weather Tamer, Inc. 253 N.L.R.B. 1139 (1980), enf. denied 676 F.2d
483 (1 Ith Cir. 1982), Ausable Communications, Inc. 273 N.L.R.B. No. 166 (1985), Univcrsidad Interamericana, 268 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1984); N.L.R.B. v. Savoy Laundry, Inc. 327 F.2d
370 (2d Cir. 1964).
100. NLRA, § 8(d).
101. See infra p. 42.
102. See, e.g. Oak-Cliff-Golman Baking Company, 207 N.L.R.B. 1063, enfd, 505 F.2d
1302 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975).
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the running of the business enterprise in which the union's members
are employed."' 0 3 Further, the Court noted that
[m]anagement must be free from the constraints of the bargaining
process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business. An employer's need for unencumbered decision making, bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact
on the continued availability of employment should be required
only if the benefit for labor management relations and the collective bargaining 1process
outweighs the burden placed on the conduct
04
of the business.
103. First National Maintenance Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
104. With respect to Subcontracting, the Supreme Court had previously held in agreement with the N.L.R.B., that in the particular circumstances of that case, there was an obligation on the part of the employer to bargain about that decision. Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964). Chief Justice Warren's opinion delineated the nature
of the Court's decision stating:
The facts of the present case illustrate the propriety of submitting the dispute to
collective negotiation. The Company's decision to contract out the maintenance
work did not alter the Company's basic operation. The maintenance work still had
to be performed at the plant. No capital investment was contemplated; the Company merely replaced existing employees with those of an independent contractor to
do the same work under similar conditions of employment. Therefore, to require the
employer to bargain about the matter would not significantly abridge his freedom to
manage the business.
We are thus not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining to hold, as we now
do, that the type of 'contracting out' involved in this case - the replacement of
employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to
do the same work under similar conditions - is a statutory subject of collective
bargaining under Section 8(d). Our decision need not and does not encompass other
forms of 'contracting out' or 'subcontracting' which arise daily in our complex
economy.
Justice Stewart delivered a concurring opinion which emphasized the limited scope of the
Court's decision and presaged the direction of the Supreme Court thereafter. (See First National Maintenance, supra note 103.) Justice Stewart stated;
subcontracting decisions are as a general matter subject to that duty. The Court
holds no more than that this employer's decision to subcontract this work, involving
'the replacement of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment' is
subject to the duty to bargain collectively.
Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain
collectively regarding . . . management decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control [such as, 'the investment in labor saving machinery or the liquidation of assets and the complete termination of business']. Decisions concerning
the commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise are not
in themselves primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of the
decision may be necessarily to terminate employment.
This kind of subcontracting falls short of such larger entrepreneurial questions as
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These declarations effectively, removed many management decisions and actions from regulation under the National Labor Relations Act.
The Court concluded that "the harm likely to be done to an
employer's need to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down
part of its business purely for economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained through the union's participation in making the decision." The Court specifically limited its decision to partial closing and did not "intimate [a] view as to other
types of management decisions, such as plant relocations, sales, other
kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc. which are to be considered
on their particular facts." The N.L.R.B. and courts of appeals have
subsequently attempted to fill the void.
The Board's test on whether certain management decisions are
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining was enunciated in Otis
Elevator Corp. (United Technologies) ("Otis I1") and involved the 3
different interpretations and analyses of the Supreme Court's decision in FirstNational Maintenance.Although Otis II involved "relocation" or "consolidation", Board members stated that the test was
applicable to various other management decisions (again with differing views by Board members). In Otis II, the Company had closed
down its research and development facility in New Jersey and transferred its operations and employees to its plant in Connecticut because its New Jersey facility was outdated and its plant in Connecticut was modern and contained a high degree of technology and
facilities; labor costs were not the motivating force. The Board (4
members) was unanimous in concluding that there was no obligation
to bargain about the decision to relocate the plant, but, in three
opinions, set forth differing rationales.
Chairman Dotson and Member Hunter reasoned:
Despite the evident effect on employees, the critical factor to a determination whether the decision is subject to mandatory bargaining is the essence of the decision itself, Le., whether it turns upon a
change in the nature or direction of the business, or turns upon
labor costs; not its effect on employees nor a union's ability to offer
alternatives.
On the particular facts of the case, they concluded that the comwhat shall be produced, how capital shall be invested in fixed assets, or what the
basic scope of the enterprise shall be. In my view, the Court's opinion has nothing to
do with whether any aspects of those larger issues could under any circumstances be
considered subjects of compulsory collective bargaining under the present law.
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pany's decision "turned not upon labor costs, but instead upon a
change in the nature and direction of a significant facet of its business. Thus, it constituted a managerial decision of the sort which is
at the core of entrepreneurial control outside the limited scope of
Section 8(d), [the duty to bargain]." Going beyond the limitations
imposed by the Supreme Court in its decision in First National
Maintenance, they also would apply the same test to decisions by an
employer to sell a business or part thereof, to dispose of its assets, to
restructure or reconsolidate operations, to subcontract, to invest in
labor-saving machinery, to change the methods of finance or of sales,
advertising, product design "and all other decisions akin to the
foregoing."
Member Dennis laid down a two-step test. First, one must determine whether the employer's decision is "amenable to resolution
through the bargaining process," - whether "a factor over which
the union has control (e.g., labor costs [is] a significant consideration
in th employer's decision," i.e., is the union "in a position to lend
assistance or offer concessions that reasonably could affect . . . the
employer's decision." If the answer is negative, the employer has no
duty to bargain over the decision. If the answer is affirmative, the
second question is to weigh the "burdens" that bargaining would
place upon the employer, such as, extent of capital investment, extent of changes, need for speed, flexibility and confidentiality, as
compared to "amenability to bargaining." If the Board found the
"burden" outweighed the "amenability," there would be no obligation to bargain. Member Dennis would apply her test to plant relocations, consolidations, automation and subcontracting; but no obligation to bargain with respect to partial closings and sales. On the
particular facts of the case, Member Dennis concluded that since no
labor-related consideration underlay the company's decision and the
union could not have offered anything to change the decision, there
was no obligation to bargain over the decision to relocate the
operations.
Member Zimmerman agreed with that conclusion, since the
company's reasons for relocating were "not amenable to bargaining.
No concession proposed by the Union could reasonably be expected
to" change the company's action. But, Member Zimmerman argued
that there could be situations where bargaining should be required
even though the reasons for the employer's actions did not turn on
labor costs where "union concessions may substantially mitigate the
concerns underlying the employer's decision, thereby convincing the
employer to rescind its decision;" in that event, there would be an
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obligation to bargain "absent any showing of the employer's urgent
need for . . . speed, flexibility or secrecy." Basically, Member Zim-

merman reiterated the test of the Supreme Court in First National
Maintenance, "whether the benefit for labor management relations
and the collective bargaining process outweighs the burden placed on
the conduct of the business." 10 5
Although the Board has undergone some change in board member since Otis II was enunciated, the current Board members have
followed Otis II broadly, without specifying which of the three analyses they embrace; 10 6 but, of course, Board members, at times, have
differed in their interpretation of the facts and the conclusions to be

drawn therefrom.10 7 The courts of appeals have, for the most part,
105. Member Zimmerman did not indicate which management decisions would come
under his test, but he applied it to relocation in Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil
Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (in which he dissented), to consolidation in Otis II and
to subcontracting in Bob's Big Boy, 264 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1982).
106. The Board often stated "[t]he conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court's
opinion in First National Maintenance and with any of the views expressed in the Board's
decision in [Otis II]." See, e.g., Oak Rubber Company, 277 N.L.R.B. 1322 (1985). But see
Parma Industries, Inc., 292 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (1989) where Member Cracraft disagreed with
the other Board members with respect to the obligation to bargain on a decision to close part
of its business or sell its assets. The Board decision states:
Absent discriminatory motivation, Member Cracraft would not find that an employer's decision to close part of its business or sell assets is a mandatory subject of
bargaining. First National Maintenance Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666 (1981)
(partial closing); General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971), petition for review denied sub nom. Auto Workers Local 864 v. N.L.R.B., 470 F.2d 422 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (sale). Member Cracraft specifically disagrees with her colleagues' claim
that 'under any of the views expressed in Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891
(1984),' an employer must bargain over partial closing and sale decisions 'predicated predominantly on labor cost considerations.' Member Cracraft points out that
in fn. 8 of Member Dennis' Otis concurrence, Member Dennis clearly and unequivocably stated that 'if the matter presented is an economically motivated partial closing or a sale, no decision bargaining is required.' Member Cracraft further observes
that, apart from the misplaced reliance on Otis, her colleagues have cited no cases
to support their novel position.
Id. at 3, n.5.
107. See Gar Wood-Detroit Truck Equipment, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1985) (no
obligation to bargain over decision to subcontract out work previously performed by employees, now to be performed by an independent contractor, at the same employer location; the
decision did not turn on labor costs, although they entered into the overhead costs which the
employer wanted to reduce); Hawthorne Mellody, Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. No. 55 (1985) (no obligation to bargain about move of delivery operations, inasmuch as decision "turned upon a
change in the nature and direction of the business," even though labor costs were "a motivating factor"). See also Columbia City Freight Lines Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 12 (1984); Fraser
Shipyards, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 496 (1984); Bostrum Division, UOP, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 999
(1984); Oak Rubber Company, 277 N.L.R.B. 1322 (1985); Inland Steel Container, 275
N.L.R.B. 929 (1985), af'd, 822 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1987); Arrow Automotive Industries, 284
N.L.R.B. No. 57 (1987), enf. denied, 853 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1988); ABS Industries, Inc., 281
N.L.R.B. No. 145 (1986); Morco Industries, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. No. 100 (1986); Pennsylvania
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accepted and approved the Board's approach in Otis 11,108 although,
on some occasion a court has attacked a particular conclusion of the
Board in rather harsh terms.' The Board extended the obligation to
bargain under Otis II to an employer's decision to layoff employees
for economic reasons (not layoffs pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement or layoffs resulting from non-mandatory decisions.110
Energy Corp. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 174 (1985); Century Air Freight, Inc. 284 N.L.R.B. No. 85
(1987).
108. See, e.g. N.L.R.B. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting and Cable Inc., 849 F.2d 15 (lst
Cir. 1988); Local 2179, United Steelworkers v. N.L.R.B. (Island Steel Container Company)
822 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1987); Weather Tamer Inc. v. N.L.R.B. 676 F.2d 483 (1lth Cir.
1982); N.L.R.B. v. Island Typographers Inc., 705 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983); Mason v. Continental Group Inc. 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1087 (1986); W.W.
Grainger, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. 860 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1988).
109. Arrow Automotive Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. 853 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1988).
The Fourth Circuit concluded that Supreme Court, in First National Maintenance, "established a per se rule that an employer has no duty to bargain over a decision to close part of
its business." The Court rejects "the Board's labor costs anaylsis [in Otis II] because it is flatly
inconsistent with First National Maintenance." Id.
The Company, an auto parts manufacturer, closed its Massachusetts plant after four
years of operating losses and transferred its work to a non-union plant in South Carolina. The
Board concluded that the Company's decision to close the plant and move the work to another
plant was based on labor cost considerations amenable to resolution through collective bargaining and that the Company was therefore obligated to bargain over the decision to close and
transfer the work; the Board reversed the ALJ's finding that the Company had satisfied its
bargaining obligation, although the Company had met and discussed the decision with the
Union.
Rejecting the Board's analysis and Otis II, the Fourth Circuit (majority; with a dissent)
stated:
First National Maintenance teaches that, contrary to the Board's holding, decisions
of the magnitude involved here remain management perogatives, not subject to a
statutory bargaining obligation. Whether on the basis of the rule set forth in First
National Maintenance, or the balancing analysis the Court followed in establishing
it, the result in this case is the same: Arrow was not obligated to bargain.
The magnitude of the decision to shut down an entire facility and to reallocate large
amounts of capital underscores the need for certainty in the conduct of business
affairs. The Board's approach to this case would leave management at sea as to
whether it had an obligation to bargain, as an employer could never be certain when
a decision might eventually be found by the Board to be too closely related to labor
costs.
The Court, also, noted that the decision to bargain cannot turn on the "label" given to the
decision, i.e. "relocation" rather than "partial closing."
But See N.L.R.B. v. Sandpiper Convalescent Center, 824 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1987) (decision
to lay off employees, as distinguished from decision to close one of its plants, is a mandatory
subject of bargaining under First National Maintenance and the Otis II costs and amenable to
resolution tests).
110. Lapeer Foundry and Machine Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (1988). An employer's
decision to lay off employee for economic reasons (not layoffs pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement or layoffs resulting from non-mandatory decisions) is a mandatory subject of
bargaining. "In determining [employer's] bargaining obligation. . .[the Board] will apply the
principles set forth in [Otis II].
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As previously indicated, where a collective bargaining agreement is in effect, an employer who seeks to modify a term or condition "contained in" the agreement must, not only bargain with respect to the change, but must obtain the union's consent before
implementing the change. With respect to a plant relocation or relocation of unit work, during the term of a collective bargaining agreement, the Board has held that an employer may remove a plant or
an operation to another location when such a decision is motivated
by economic considerations, including labor costs, (after bargaining
too impasse, where required under Otis II), absent a specific provision to the contrary in the collective bargaining agreement, i.e., unWhen a business is confronted with an economic problem such as declining sales,
excessive inventory, or an unprofitable department, it may have several options to
address this problem. Management may decide, for example, to lay off employees,
to shut down the unprofitable department, or to consolidate operations and transfer
work to a more efficient plant. Although job losses may result whether the decision
is to lay off, shut down, or consolidate, the focus of the decision to lay off differs
from the focus of the other two decisions in a critical manner. In deciding to lay off
employees, management directly alters employees' terms of employment. This decision, like the decision to reduce workers' wages, necessarily turns on labor costs
because the decision itself is to modify terms of employment in order to save money
during economic downturns. By contrast, the decisions in FNM to shut down and in
Otis to consolidate part of the business involved a direct modification of the business
structure. Those decisions had only a secondary effect of altering employees' terms
of employment. Accordingly, pursuant to the Otis plurality two-factor test, the decision to shut down part of the business or consolidate operations affects the scope,
direction, or nature of the business and need not be bargained. On the other hand,
the decision to lay off turns on labor costs and must be bargained. The Otis two-step
test of Member Dennis mandates the same conclusion. A decision to lay off is predicated on the assumption that savings will accrue from reduced labor costs during a
period when a full complement of workers is unnecessary. Labor-related considerations therefore form the basis for the decision. As a union has control over this
labor-related factor, it can offer alternatives to the layoff, such as wage reductions,
modified work rules, or part-time schedules for a larger group, in order to save the
company money during the economic downturn. Accordingly, the layoff decision is
amenable to resolution through the collective-bargaining process. With regard to the
burden placed on the business, we note that a decision solely to lay off employees
does not involve an investment of capital, an alteration of the company's basic operations, nor a need for confidentiality. Although management has a legitimate concern with the need for speed and flexibility in effectuating a layoff to remedy its
economic plight, we believe that the legal requirements that exist to ensure meaningful bargaining in a timely fashion address this concern adequately. We therefore
find that the burden borne by management in having to bargain over an economic
layoff decision is outweighted by the benefit for the collective-bargaining process,
In light of the above analysis, we conclude that the decision to lay off employees for
economic reasons is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Consequently, an employer
must provide notice to and bargain with the union concerning the decision to lay off
bargaining unit employees and the effects of that decision. Id.
See also Litton Financial Printing Division, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (1987).
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less (1) the right to relocate is expressly waived in the agreement, or
(2) the agreement contains a work preservation clause, a clause
which expressly preserves the work for the bargaining unit employees for the term of the contract.111 The Board has applied the same
rule to subcontracting during the term of the collective bargaining
agreement."12
Regardless of whether or not an employer, in a particular situation has an obligation to bargain about a management decision to
shut down, relocate, consolidate, subcontract, etc., which affects employee "wages, hours and other terms of employment," the employer
has the obligation to bargain over the "effects" of the employer's
decision, absent a clear and express waiver by the union.
Perhaps in an effort to soften the impact of its non-mandatory
conclusion, the Supreme Court emphasized that "the Union must be
given a significant opportunity to bargain about these matters of job
security as part of the 'effects' bargaining mandated by Section
8(a)(5)"; that "bargaining over the effects of a decision must be conducted in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time, and the
Board may impose sanctions to insure its adequacy"; that a "Union,
by pursuing such bargaining rights may achieve valuable concessions
from an employer engaged in a partial closing"; that by bargaining
over effects of the decision to partially close the Union "indirectly
may insure that the decision itself is deliberately considered"; that a
Union is protected "against a partial closing decision that is motivated by an intent to harm the Union." Finally, the Supreme Court
suggests that under certain circumstances, such as, where labor costs
are an important factor in the decision to close, "management will
have an incentive to confer voluntarily with the Union to seek concessions that may make continuing the business profitable" (emphasis supplied).113

Plant closings and/or layoffs of employees, and the controversy
and the differences between President Reagan and the Congress in
1988, on the issues of requiring notice prior to such actions by em1!1. Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984)
affid sub nom U.A.W. v. N.L.R.B., 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Milwaukee Spring II").

See also Suburban Transit Corp. 276 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (1985); Brown Company, 278 N.L.R.B.
783 (1986); De Soto, Inc. 278 N.L.R.B. 788 (1986) National Metalcrafters, Inc., 276
N.L.R.B. No. 14 (1985); Consumers Distributing Company, Ltd. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 50
(1985); Jaydon, Inc. 273 N.L.R.B. No. 199 (1985).
112. See e.g. Gar Wood-Detroit Truck Equipment, Inc. 274 N.L.R.B. 113 (1985); Midwest Sanitary Service, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 624 (1984).
113. See also, Otis Elevator Company, 283 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1987) ("Otis III"); Garwood-Detroit Truck Equipment, supra note 112.
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ployers, highlighted the federal policy of regulation/deregulation.
When Congress passed the long awaited Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act ("Trade Bill") in April 1988, it included a provision
which required a company with more than 100 employees to give
sixty days' advance notice of a plant closing or a mass layoff lasting
more than six months. President Reagan vetoed the trade bill on
May 24, 1988 largely because of the plant closing provision. He and
others felt that it was a matter best left for the parties. An effort to
override the veto proved unsuccessful; on May 24, 1988 the House
overrode the veto but on June 8, the Senate sustained the veto by a
slight margin. Eight days later, a bill was introduced in the Senate,
identical to the vetoed plant closing provision, as a separate piece of
legislation. On June 13, 1988, Congress passed the Workers Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act ("WARN") " 4 and "[a]fter
much soul searching and head counting, President Reagan let
[WARN] become law on August 4, 1988, despite his serious reservations concerning the fundamental concept of mandatory notice" by
an employer prior to a plant closing or mass layoff." 5 WARN became effective February 4, 1989.116

Under WARN, covered employers who close a plant, or an operating unit within a plant, or institute a mass layoff, must notify
local government officials and affected employees (through their
union representatives, if any), in writing, at least sixty (60) days in
advance of the closing or layoff'1 7 unless the closing or layoff falls
within an exception or exemption under the Act," 8 (such as a layoff
at a "temporary" facility, a lawful lockout, replacement of strikers,
result of a natural disaster or by "business circumstances that were
not reasonably foreseeable") in which case the employer must give
as much notice as is reasonably possible. Failure to comply with the
advance notice provisions of WARN subjects the employer to a potential lawsuit by affected employees for back pay and all employee
benefits that would have accrued under any ERISA plan for each
day of violation to a maximum of 60 days, civil penalties of $500 per
day for a maximum of 60 days ($30,000) for each closing or layoff
where notice has not been properly given, payable to the unit of local
government that should have received notice, attorney's fees at the
114. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
115. Charles T. Carroll, Plant Closings Nuances: Avoiding Last Minute Compliance
Difficulties, Lab. L. J., Sept. 1988, at 643.
116. But see, infra p. 38.
117. 29 U.S.C. 2102.
118. Id.; 29 U.S.C. 2103.
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court's discretion; these penalties may be mitigated under certain
circumstances." 19
An employer is subject to WARN, if the employer employs at
least 100 full time employees or 100 employees (regardless of full
time status) who work an aggregate of 4000 hours per week (exclusive of overtime) .120 The plant closing and layoff provisions comes
into play only if there is an "employment loss" (i.e.,- employees receive the benefits of WARN only if there is an "employment loss" as
a result of a plant closing or layoff). "Employment loss" means "(A)
an employment termination, other than a discharge for cause, a voluntary departure, or a retirement or (B) a layoff exceeding six
months or (C) a reduction in hours or work of more than fifty (50)
per cent during each month of a six month period."''
A permanent or temporary shutdown of a site of employment or
a facility or operating unit within a single site of employment is a
plant closing if the shut down results in an employment loss for 50 or
more full-time employees during an 30-day period. 22 A reduction in
force (that is not a plant closing) is a mass layoff if it results in an
employment loss at a single site of employment during any 30 day
period for (1) 33 percent of the full time employees and at least 50
full time employees, or (2) at least 500 full time employees without
regard to percentage. 123 Note that, in view of the 6 months definition
of "employment loss" layoff, a layoff originally contemplated and
announced for less than six months (and therefore not an "employment loss") which extends beyond the six months becomes a "mass
layoff," "employment loss" unless the extension beyond the six
months was not reasonably foreseeable at the time notice should
have been given and the employer provides notice as soon as it is
119.

29 U.S.C. 2104. The Court has discretion to reduce the penalties if the employer

demonstrates that the violation was in "good faith" and that the employer had "reasonable
ground" for believing that its actions were not a violation of WARN. Individual damages
would also be reduced by (1)payment of wages made during the violation period; (2) voluntary payments made to the employee that is not required by any legal obligation; and (3)
payment or service credit under an employee benefit plan on behalf of employee. In no event
may the court award damages for more than one-half the number of days of employment to a
maximum of 60 days. The civil penalty of $500 per day is waived if the employer pays to each
aggrieved employee the total amount due within three weeks from the date the employer orders the shut down or lay off. Id.
120. 29 U.S.C. 2101. A "part-time employee" is an employee who is employed for an
average of fewer than 20 hours per week or who has been employed for fewer than 6 of the 12
months preceeding the date on which notice is required.
121. 29 U.S.C. 2101.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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reasonably foreseeable that the layoff would extend beyond six
months.124 Similarly, where two or more groups of employees, each
consisting of less than the minimum required to constitute an "employment loss, ....
plant closing,....
mass layoff," within a 90-day period when combined meet the numerical requirements such combined layoffs constitute an "employment loss" under WARN unless
the employer can demonstrate that the two or more employment
losses are the result of separate and distinct actions and not an attempt to evade WARN. 2 '
Finally, an employee will not have suffered an "employment
loss" as a result of relocation of an employer's operations, in whole
or in part, if (1) the employer offers the employee a transfer to a
different site of employment within a "reasonable commuting distance" with no more than a 6-month break in employment, or (2) if
the employee accepts an offer of employment at a different site (regardless of distance) within 30 days of the offer, closing or layoff
(whichever is later) with no more than 6-month break in
employment."2 6
WARN does not supersede or preempt other statutes dealing
with plant closings or layoffs. It specifically declares "[t]he rights
and remedies provided to employees by this Act are in addition to,
and not in lieu of, any other contractual or statutory rights and remedies, except that the period of notification required by this Act shall
run concurrently with any period of notification required by contract
or any other statute."12 7 Further, "nothing in this Act shall be
deemed to validate or invalidate any judicial or administrative ruling
relating to the hiring of permanent replacements for economic strikers under the National Labor Relations Act"; 2 and "[t]he remedies
provided for in this [Act] shall be the exclusive remedies for any
violation of this Act. Under this Act, a Federal Court shall not have
authority to enjoin a plant closing or mass Jayoff."' 29
Although the concept and purpose of WARN is basically a very
simple one, that "with certain exceptions, employers of 100 or more
workers must give at least 60 days' advance notice of a plant closing
or mass layoff to affected workers or their representatives, to the
State dislocated worker unit, and to the appropriate local govern124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

29 U.S.C.
Id.
29 U.S.C.
29 U.S.C.
29 U.S.C.
29 U.S.C.

2101.
2101.
2105.
2103.
2104.
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ment,"1 s it has become apparent from the comments received by the
Department of Labor and statements and speeches by management
and labor, many questions will be raised and, undoubtedly, be the
subject of litigation in the federal courts.1 31 And, although the Act
provides for the Secretary of Labor to issue "interpretative regulations," the Department of labor does not have the authority or responsibility to enforce the provisions of WARN; that is left to the
federal courts and probably before juries. Indeed, the "Interim Interpretative Rule" Implementing WARN and "Supplemental Information" published by the Department of Labor on Dec. 2, 1988, highlighted the legal issues presented by WARN when the very first
issue it raised and left unresolved was the question whether the Act
required notices as early as December 6, 1988 for plant closings and
mass layoffs which occur after February 4, 1989, the effective date
of the Act, or require notices only after February 4, 1989 for plant
closings and mass layoffs which occur on February 4, 1989 and
thereafter. "DOL views the effective date provision to mean that
covered employment action which occur on or after February 4,
1989 are subject to the notice of requirements," so that notice may
be required as early as December 6, 1988; employers are, therefore,
"best advised to proceed conservatively and to provide notice" for
full 60 days prior to any plant closing or mass layoff that will occur
after February 4, 1989, the effective date of the Act.
"The issues and problems of WARN boggle [the] mind."132
STRIKES/SYMPATHY STRIKES

The right to strike, in the private sector, is unquestionably guaranteed under the NLRA. However, it is a right which a collective
bargaining representative may waive and, indeed, many collective
bargaining agreements contain no-strike/no lockout provisions. Inasmuch as it is a waiver of a guaranteed right, the waiver must be
clear and explicit. Over the years, a no-strike waiver was strictly
construed. Accordingly, a general no-strike clause, absent clear evi130. Dept. of Labor (Employment and Training Administration) (Interim Interpretation
Rule and Supplemental Information), 20 CFR Part 639, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 232, E1 (Dec. 2, 1988).
131. Id.; Dept. of Lab, 20 C.F.R. Ch. 5, Daily Lab. Rep. No. 209, D (Oct. 28, 1988);
Daily Lab. Rep. No. 211, A (Nov. 1, 1988); Daily Lab. Rep. No. 207, A, A-8, D, E (Oct. 26,
1988); Daily Lab. Rep. No. 228, E-1 (Nov. 28, 1988); Daily Lab. Rep. No. 232, A (Dec. 2,
1988); Daily Lab. Rep. No. 226, A-3 (Nov. 23, 1988); Daily Lab. Rep. No. 233, A (Dec. 5,
1988); Daily Lab. Rep. No. 35, D (Feb. 23, 1989).
132. Rosemary M. Collyer, General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Daily
Lab. Rep., No. 226, A-3 (Nov. 23, 1988).
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dence to the contrary, was construed by the Board not to prohibit a
sympathy strike - a refusal by employees to cross another union's
picket line.13
Overruling that line of cases, recently the Board concluded that
a "broad no-strike clause bars employees from honoring stranger
picket lines."' 134 On remand, the Board stated;
we can discern no logical or practical basis for the proposition that
the prohibition of all 'strikes' does not include sympathy strikes
merely because the word 'sympathy' is not used .... If a collective

bargaining agreement prohibits strikes, [the Board] shall read the
prohibition plainly and literally as prohibiting all strikes, including
sympathy strikes. If, however, the contract or extrinsic evidence
demonstrates that the parties intended to exempt sympathy strikes,
[the Board] shall give the parties' intent controlling weight. 35
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia approved the
Board's approach, but, because the Board "failed to do what its
opinion acknowledges it must do in interpreting a no-strike clause:
'give the parties' intent controlling weight . . . whether that intent is
established by the language of the clause itself, by inferences drawn
from the contract as a whole, or by extrinsic evidence"; the court
remanded the case to the Board for examination of the extrinsic evidence, specifically, evidence of bargaining history. On remand, the
Board (Stephens & Cracraft; Johansen, concurring) reversed its
prior conclusions and found that, although the language of the no133. See Davis-Mckee, 238 N.L.R.B. 652 (1978).
134. Indianapolis Power and Light Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1715 (1985), remanded sub. nom.
Local Union 395, IBEW v. N.L.R.B., 797 F.2d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1986), on remand, 291
N.L.R.B. No. 145 (1988).
135. Id.; See also Metropolitan Edison Co., 279 N.L.R.B. No. 47 (1988), review den.
sub nom., IBEW v. N.L.R.B., 826 F.2d 1283 (3rd Cir, 1987); Cf Ariz. Public Service Co., 273
N.L.R.B. 1757 (1985), enf. den. and remanded, 788 F.2d 1412 (9th cir. 1986); Oil, Chemical
& Atomic Workers, Local 1-547 v. N.L.R.B., 842 F.2d 1141 (9th cir. 1988). It should be
noted that absent a no-strike clause or a clause which precludes a sympathy strike, a refusal by
an employee to cross a picket line is protected concerted activity and such employee may not
be disciplined or discharged; that employee is akin to an economic striker and has similar
rights; she may be replaced, if business requires. Butterworth-Manning-Ashmore Mortuary,
270 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (1984), 120 L.R.R.M. 2632 (9th Cir. 1985); Business Services by
Manpower, 272 N.L.R.B. No. 119 (1984), enf. den., 784 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1986) 121
L.R.R.M. 2827; Astabula Forge, Division of ABS Company, 269 N.L.R.B. No. 138 (1984);
Redwing Carriers, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), enfd, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Some
members of the Board and some courts have made a distinction between a refusal to cross a
picket line at the premises of the employee's employer and a stranger picket line at another
employer's premises. See N.L.R.B. v. William S. Carroll, Inc., 578 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978);
Montana Dakota Util. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 455 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972); Business Services by
Manpower, supra. The majority of the Board regards both activities protected concerted
activities.
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strike clause in the contract standing alone is sufficient to cover sympathy strikes, a review of the record testimony, particularly the finding of the administrative law judge crediting the testimony of the
union's negotiator, "the bargaining history evidences an agreement
to disagree over the scope of the no-strike clause [and] there was no
waiver [by the union] of the right to honor stranger picket lines."
Member Johansen, concurring in the result, reiterated his previous
dissent on the Board's initial conclusion and, relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B.,1 6
(that there must be a "clear and unmistakable" waiver of a statutory
right) would find that "a general no-strike provision . . . standing
alone, is insufficient to find a clear and unmistakable waiver of the
right to engage in sympathy strikes under that exacting standard."
LOCKOUTS/TEMPORARY REPLACEMENTS

In the arsenal of weapons, unions may resort to a strike. As
indicted above, generally, a strike is protected concerted activity and,
absent overriding considerations (e.g., no-strike clause, misconduct,
non-compliance with pre-strike notice requirements), strikers may
not be discharged or discriminated against.
Employers may, on the other hand, utilize their arsenal of
weapons. Thus, in response to a strike, an employer may hire
replacements. If the strike is a lawful economic strike, the employer
may hire permanent replacements and, when a striker applies for
reinstatement, the employer has no obligation to discharge the permanent replacement to make way for the striker; his only obligation
is to put the returning striker on a preferential hiring list. If the
strike is an unfair labor practice strike (protesting unfair labor practices of an employer), the employer may hire replacements, but if a
striker offers to return to work, the employer must reinstate such
striker even if it requires the termination of the replacement."' 7
In the arsenal of weapons, the employer also has available to
him another weapon to bring to bear in an economic dispute with the
union, namely, the lockout. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
the right of an employer, generally, to engage in a defensive lock136. 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
137. But see Belknar, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983) (permanent strike replacements
may bring misrepresentation and breach of contract action in state court against an employer
who later replaced them by reinstated strikers). See also N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enfd, 414 F.2d
99 (7th Cir. 1969).
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out 1'a and in an offensive lockout,139 rather than await the strike by
the union. Further, in a defensive lockout, the employer may hire
temporary replacements.1 40 The question left unanswered, by the
U.S. Supreme Court, was "whether an employer who lawfully locks
out his employees to support a bargaining position [an offensive lockout] may go further and hire temporary replacements to continue
normal operations."' 4' The Board and the Courts had answered the
question both ways in the past. 42 Recently, a majority of the Board
concluded that "absent specific proof of anti-union motivation, [an
employer may use] temporary employees in order to engage in business during an otherwise lawful lockout, including a lockout initiated
solely for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear in support of a
legitimate bargaining position." Further, "the absence of [bargaining] impasse ...[and] the absence of a reasonable fear of strike...

are not dispositive with respect to the post-lockout use of temporary
employees. They may, however, be relevant in a case where the employer's professed business motivation is challenged as pretextual.' 43 Upholding the Board's conclusion that the use of temporary
replacements is neither inherently destructive of employee rights nor
inherently prejudicial to the Union's interest and has only "a comparatively slight adverse effect on protected employee rights," the
Court stated, "[t]he use of replacements during the lockout was a
tactic chosen by the employer obviously to put pressure upon the
union. Such pressure, however, affects the realities of the union's
bargaining positions rather than any right as such to bargain collec44
tively, strike or engage in other concerted activity."'
138. N.L.R.B. v. Truck Drivers Local 449 (Buffalo Linen Supply Co.), 353 U.S. 87
(1957).
139. American Ship Building Co. v. N.L.R.B., 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
140. N.L.R.B. v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
141. Harter Equipment, Inc. 280 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1986).
142. See Ottawa Silica Co., 197 F.2d 449 (1972), enfd, 482 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1973);
Inter Collegiate Press, 199 N.L.R.B. 177 (1972), enfd 486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1973); Loomis
Courier Service, 235 N.L.R.B. No. 60 (1978), rev'd, 595 F.2d 491 (1979).
143. Harter Equipment, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1986), review denied, sub. nom.
Local 825, International Union of Operating Engineers v. N.L.R.B., 829 F.2d 458 (3rd Cir.
1987).
144. In assessing the legality of the employer's action in hiring temporary replacements,
reference is made to the test set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967) as follows:
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct
was "inherently destructive" of important employee rights, no proof of anti-union
motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the
employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business considerations. Second, if the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct on employee rights
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Although neither the N.L.R.B. nor the courts have passed upon
the legality of hiring permanent replacements during a lawful lockout,14 5 the General Counsel of the N.L.R.B. has taken the position
that hiring of permanent replacements during a lockout is unlawful
because it is "inherently destructive" of the fundamental Section 7
right of collective bargaining and even if the impact on employee
rights were "comparatively slight" it would still lack a legitimate
and substantial business justification. " 6
NLRA

AND ARBITRATION UNDER A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT

Where an employer and a labor organization are in a collective
bargaining relationship and the collective bargaining agreement contains grievance/arbitration provisions for the resolution of disputes
between the parties, it often occurs that an action by an employer
may constitute a matter which is arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement and, also, be a matter which may constitute an
unfair labor practice under the NLRA. Thus, for example, a unilateral change of wages, hours or working conditions by an employer
during the term of the collective bargaining agreement may present
a dispute over the terms and meaning of the contract and thus present an arbitrable issue under the contract; such unilateral action
may also constitute an unfair labor practice in violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA, i.e., a failure to bargain by bypassing the
collective bargaining representative.
Another example is employer discipline of an employee for pursuing a grievance. Such action by the employer may present an arbitrable dispute under the collective bargaining agreement, for example, discharge was not for just cause, and, also, constitute an unfair
labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the NLRA,
for example, discrimination for engaging in union or protected conis "comparatively slight", an anti-union motivation must be proved to sustain the

charge if the employer has come forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial
business justifications for the conduct.
See, also Boilermakers v. N.L.R.B. (Gold Bond Building Products Div. of National Gypsum),
858 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (hiring of temporary replacements during offensive lockout was
not "inherently destructive" of employee rights, did not affect the process of collective bargaining and hiring of temporary workers was not likely to, and in fact did not cause division among
company's employees; temporary replacements were hired only for duration of lockout and
locked out employees could return to their employment by accepting employer's contract
offer.)
145. See N.L.R.B. v. Brown Food Store at 292-294. See also supra note 140.
146. N.L.R.B.'s General Counsel's Report for Second Quarter of 1988, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 220, D-1 (Nov. 15, 1988).
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certed activity.
Several questions are presented: Suppose the aggrieved union
invoked the processes of the Board and files an unfair labor practice
charge alleging an 8(a)(5) violation, should the Board process that
charge or should the Board, at least initially, compel the charging
party to first pursue the grievance/arbitration machinery under the
collective bargaining agreement. A similar question is presented in
the second example, if the aggrieved union or the aggrieved employee files an unfair labor practice charge alleging a violation of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the N.L.R.B., should the charging party
be required by the Board to first pursue the matter in the grievance/
arbitration forum?
Suppose the aggrieved union or employee has, in fact, pursued
the grievance/arbitration procedures under the collective bargaining
agreement, and the arbitrator has issued a decision which is adverse,
in whole or in part, to the union/employee. For example, when the
arbitrator ruled against the union/employee on the merits or failed
to give a full and adequate remedy. Suppose the union/employee,
thereupon, files an unfair labor practice charge with the Board,
based upon the same activity, what should the Board do with the
unfair labor practice charge?
The Board's answer to those questions was to make an "accommodation between, on the one hand, the fullest use of the collective
bargaining and the arbitral process and, on the other, the statutory
policy reflected by Congress' grant to the Board of exclusive jurisdiction to prevent unfair labor practices. 147 The accommodation was a
deferral by the Board to the arbitration process under the collective
bargaining agreement, with certain safeguards established by the
Board. The Board's deferral policy is a declaration by the Board that
the parties utilize the dispute settlement mechanisms agreed upon
mutually by the parties and contained in their collective bargaining
agreement, and to minimize the involvement and intervention by the
government. As we will see, there is some intervention by the government when the arbitration process does not meet the standards and
safeguards established by the Board.
This deferral doctrine was first enunciated by the Board when
the union/employee, unhappy with the decision of the arbitrator following the grievance/arbitration proceedings under the collective
bargaining agreement, invoked the processes of the Board by filing
147.

Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 841 (1971).
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an unfair labor practice charge. In Spielberg Mfg. Co.,148 the Board
adopted a policy of deferral to the arbitrator's award and refused to
pass upon the unfair labor practice charge where the arbitration
"proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties had
agreed to be bound; and the decision of the arbitration panel is not
clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act" 149 and the
arbitrator had considered the unfair labor practice issue. 150 Recently,
the Board has expanded and liberalized this deferral policy. In Olin
Corp.15' the Board has stated that it will presume that the arbitrator
has considered the unfair labor practice issue if (1) the contractual
issue is "factually parallel" to the unfair labor practice issue, and (2)
the arbitrator "was presented generally with the facts relevant to
resolving the unfair labor practice." In assessing whether the arbitration result was "clearly repugnant" to the Act, the Board modified
its Spielberg requirement that "an arbitrator's award

. . .

be totally

consistent with Board precedent;" the Board will now defer "unless
the award is palpably wrong', i.e., unless the arbitrator's decision is
not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act." Further, the party advocating nondeferral by the Board has the burden
of affirmatively demonstrating the defects in the arbitral process or
the award.
In Collyer Insulated Wire, 52 the Board applied its deferral policy to require a party to first utilize the grievance/arbitration procedures under the collective bargaining agreement, rather than process
the unfair labor practice charge; where a charge has been filed, the
Agency will "freeze" the charge, direct the parties to utilize the arbitration process under the contract, and, after the arbitrator's
award, the Board, if necessary, apply the Spielberg/Olintest, to determine whether deferral is warranted. The Collyer case involved a
possible violation of the duty to bargain under Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act. In National Radio Co.,' 53 the Board extended the Collyer
deferral policy to cases involving discrimination against an employee,
in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. In General American
Transportation Corp.,5 the Board overruled National Radio and
held that it would not apply Collyer in 8a(1) and (3) cases because
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
Id. at 1082.
Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).
268 N.L.R.B. 573, 577 (1984).
See supra note 147.
198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
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they involved the statutory rights of employees and limited Collyer
to cases involving the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Recently, United Technologies Corp. the Board overruled
General American and returned to National Radio. 5B The Board,
will now apply its pre-arbitral deferral policy to employee discrimination cases and refusal to bargain cases and thus permit the parties
to resolve their labor disputes through their own agreed upon
method, with a minimum of federal intervention.
A thorny issue which has yet to be fully resolved is the status of
the agreed upon arbitration process, agreed upon by the employer
and the union and embodied in the collective bargaining agreement,
when that agreement has expired and the parties are negotiating another agreement. For example, the survival of the grievance/arbitration process post-contract-expiration, or the obligation of the parties
to honor the grievance/arbitration process during the hiatus between
contracts, under the National Labor Relations Act.
Preliminarily, it must be noted that under the NLRA, upon the
expiration of a collective bargaining agreement while the parties are
negotiating a new contract, the parties are required to maintain the
status quo with respect to wages, hours and working conditions until,
inter alia, the negotiations come to impasse; an employer may not
unilaterally change the wages, hours and working conditions during
the negotiations, unless the parties are at impasse, in which event,
the employer may unilaterally institute changes compatible with the
employer's pre-impasse proposals.1" 6 While the status quo if often
referred to in terms of a continuation of the terms and conditions of
mandatory subjects of bargaining contained in the contract, it is not
totally accurate and oversimplistic; thus, the union security and the
check-off provisions of the contract do not survive the expiration of
the contract. 5 '
155.
156.

268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); N.L.R.B. v. Crompton-Highland Mills,

Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949). There are other conditions or events which may permit changes,
without impasse, e.g. the employer and the union agree to such changes pending negotiations;
the union waived the right to bargain; the employment terms for replacements of strikers (See,
Service Electric Co., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 107 (1986); Lincoln, A Subsidiary of Pentair, 125

LRRM 1374 (Advice Mem. 1987)); where the expired contract is an 8(f) contract in the
construction industry. See John Deklewa & Sons, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (1987).
157.

Bethlehem Steel Company (Shipbuilding Div.) 136 N.L.R.B. 1500 (1962), enfd in

part, sub. nom., Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v. N.L.R.B., 320 F.2d
615 (3rd Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984 (1964); Robbins Door & Sash Co., 260
N.L.R.B. 659 (1982); Hassett Maintenance Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1982); But see Stan-

dard Oil Company of California, Western Operations, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B 520 (1963); FritoLay, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 137 (1979); Lowell Corrugated Container Corporation, 177 N.L.R.B.
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Thus, there is presented the issue of the survival of the grievance/arbitration provisions after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement and the issue is heightened by the Supreme
Court's characterization of the arbitration process. In Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 58 the Supreme Court, on the one
hand, "gave effect to the congressional policy in favor of voluntary
settlement of disputes through arbitration by creating a presumption
of arbitrability" in suits to compel arbitration under Section 301,159
but, on the other hand, emphasized that "arbitration is a matter of
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
dispute which he has not agreed to submit." In Nolde Bros. Inc. v.
Local 358 Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, AFL-CIO,6 0
the Supreme Court held that an employer was obligated to arbitrate,
under the arbitration procedures in the expired collective bargaining
agreement, a claim for severance pay which was called for by that
expired agreement but to which the employees became entitled, if at
all, only when the plant shut down several days after the expiration
of the contract. Relying upon the federal policy favoring arbitration,
169 (1969).
158. 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 185 states: (a) [Venue, amount, and citizenship] Suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this Act [chapter], or between any such labor organization,
may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction or the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
(b) [Responsibility for acts of agent; entity for purposes of suit; enforcement of money
judgments] Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act [chapter] and any employer whose activities affect commerce as
defined in this Act [chapter] shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the
courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district
court of the United States. Any money judgment against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
(c) [Jurisdiction] For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against labor organizations in the district courts of the United States, district courts shall be deemed to have
jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its
principal offices, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing or acting for employee members.
(d) [Service of process] The service of summons, subpoena, or other legal process of any
court of the United States upon an officer or agent of a labor organization, in his capacity as
such, shall constitute service upon the labor organization.
(e) [Determination of question of agency] For the purposes of this section, in determining
whether any person is acting as an "agent" of another person so as to make such other person
responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.
160. 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
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the Supreme Court concluded that, "where the dispute is over a provision of the expired agreement, the presumptions favoring arbitrability must be negated expressly or by clear implication." With
respect to the particular severance pay grievance, the court concluded "[t]he dispute, . . . although arising after the expiration of

the collective bargaining contract, clearly arises under that contract." Nolde arose in the context of a suit under Section 301.
The survival of the arbitration obligation after the expiration of
the collective bargaining agreement under the NLRA has traversed
a varied course before by the Board. In Hilton Davis Chemical
Company, Division of Sterling Drug,Inc.,'61 the Board held that although an employer is obligated during a contractual hiatus to honor
the grievance procedure under the expired contract, it was not obligated to honor the arbitration procedure. In American Sink Top &
Cabinet Co.,' 6 1 relying" upon Nolde, the Board held that the employer was obligated to process to arbitration a grievance that was
arguably based on the expired contract and there was no reason to
believe that the parties intended arbitration to end with the expiration of the contract. 63
The current position of the Board was enunciated in Indiana
and Michigan Electric Company."" The Board noted that Nolde involved "a suit to compel arbitration and thus focused on the interpretation of a contract rather than the interpretation of the National
Labor Relations Act." Accordingly, the Board concluded, that
Nolde did not override Hilton Davis, but rather reaffirmed the principle that arbitration arises from mutual consent and not from a
statutory obligation to arbitrate.
In Indiana and Michigan, during the hiatus between the expiration of the 1976-1978 collective bargaining agreement and the execution of the 1979-1981 agreement, the employer processed grievances through the various steps of the grievance procedures, but
refused to proceed to arbitration on nine alleged violations of the
contract which occurred during the contractual hiatus. The Board, in
three opinions (Babson & Stephens; Dotson dissenting in part; Johansen concurring in part and dissenting in part) reaffirmed its deci161.

185 N.L.R.B. 241 (1970).

162.

242 N.L.R.B. 408 (1979).

163. See also Dismor Equipment Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1982); Southwest Security
Equipment Corp. 262 N.L.R.B. 665 (1982), cert. denied, Southwest Security Equipment Corp.
v. N.L.R.B., 470 U.S. 1087 (1985). Cf. Cardinal Operating Company, Jointly owned by Ohio
Power Company and Buckeye Power Company, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 42 (1979).
164. 284 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (1987).
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sion in Hilton Davis, with some modification - an employer has an
obligation to follow the grievance procedures of the expired contract
during the hiatus period post expiration, but the "Act does not im-

pose a duty to adhere to the arbitration procedure independent of
any contractual commitment to do so;" but, "Nolde teaches us that

in certain circumstances the arbitration commitment survives the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement embodying it" and,

therefore, an employer remains "subject to a potentially viable contractual commitment to arbitrate even after the contracts expired."
Accordingly, the Board concluded that, with respect to the arbi-

tration issues, Indiana Michigan had violated the Act by announcing
to the Union upon the expiration of the 1976-1978 contract that it

would not arbitrate any grievance filed during the contractual hiatus
by routinely refusing to arbitrate hiatus grievances as they arose, be-

cause such "unqualified" repudiation of arbitration post expiration of
the contract "encompassed not only grievances for which there may
have been no post expiration obligation to arbitrate under Nolde, but
also grievances arbitrable under Nolde."'1 5 With respect to the
processing of grievances, the Board reiterated that an employer is

obligated to continue to follow the grievance procedures (as distinguished from arbitration) post expiration of a contract. 166
While the Board may have, at least for the time being, resolved
165. With respect to the specific nine hiatus grievances which the company refused to
arbitrate, the Board (Dotson, Babson, Stephens; Johansen dissent) concluded that the company had no obligation to arbitrate any of them because the rights invoked in each grievance
did not "arise under" the expired contract within the meaning of Nolde - "a dispute based on
post expiration events arises under the contract within the meaning of Nolde only if it concerns
contract rights capable of occurring or vesting to some degree during the life of the contract
and ripening or remaining enforceable after the contract expires," e.g. pension benefits clause,
sale of business successor obligation clause. The nine hiatus grievances "were triggered by
events or conduct that occurred after the expiration of the contracts. None of the rights invoked were worked for or accumulated over time." Member Johansen disagreed and argued
that the company should be required to arbitrate the nine hiatus grievances because "specific
contract rights were invoked by each . . . therefore, the grievance disputes were over provisions of the expired contracts and thus arose under the contracts within the meaning of Nolde.
Further evaluation of the extent of the contract rights invoked encroaches on the merits of the
dispute, an area reserved for the arbitrator." 430 U.S. 243-5.
166. Chairman Dotson dissented in part. Although Dotson adhered to the rule that an
employer has an obligation at all times under Section 8(d) to meet and confer with a bargaining representative about employee grievances, there should not be an obligation to follow the
specific contracted grievance procedures which were in the expired contract. He concluded that
although the company's "blanket repudiation of 'initial arbitration' [which was the last step of
the grievance procedure short of arbitration] was unlawfully overbroad," the company had no
obligation to follow the "initial arbitration" process. To that extent, Dotson would have overruled Board precedent and would hold that the post expiration duty to follow the contractual
grievance procedure generally exists only to the extent of a parallel post expiration duty to
arbitrate grievances "arising under" the contract, as in Hilton Davis modified by Nolde.
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the issue of the extent of the survival of the arbitration obligation
post contract expiration under the NLRA and made its accommodation of the NLRA obligation with the Supreme Court's Section 301
obligation under Nolde, the subsidiary issues are still open for resolution and differences of opinion, on a case by case basis. The subsidiary issues are: (1) whether the language of the arbitration clause in
the expired contract was sufficient to overcome, expressly or by clear
implication, the presumption that the obligation to arbitrate imposed
by the contract extended to disputes arising under the contract and
occurring after the contract had expired; (2) whether the subject of
the grievance was one "arising under" the expired contract within
the meaning of Nolde; (3) whether refusal of the employer to arbitrate grievances was a general across-the-board refusal to arbitrate
based upon the expiration of the contract or the arbitrability of specific grievances. 67
SETTLEMENT OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES CASES

Although the NLRA provides a machinery for initiating unfair
labor practice proceeding against employers and labor organizations
and litigating such cases before an administrative law judge and appeals to the Board, the federal courts of appeals, and, at time, the
U.S. Supreme Court, the General Counsel and the Board are committed, wherever possible, to resolve these matters through settlement rather than through litigation. At every stage of the processing
of a "meritorious" (probably or actually meritorious) case, the
Agency will make every effort to seek and encourage settlement. Accordingly, many cases are settled by the parties, prior to any formal
action or proceeding by the Agency. For example, bilateral agreement between the charging party and the charged party prior to the
167. See Dallas Morning News, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (1987), (the evidence was "ambiguous insofar as the issue of an undifferentiated blanket refusal is concerned;" the Board

could not "say that a preponderance of the record evidence weighs in favor of finding...
wholesale repudiation if the arbitration procedure;" Litton Financial Printing Division, A Division of Litton Business System, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (1987) ("generalized refusal to
arbitrate. . . based upon the expiration of the contract rather than the arbitrability of specific
grievances;" dissent by Dotson); UPPCO, Inc. 288 N.L.R.B. No. 98 (1988) (where the expired

contract provided for recall on basis of plant wide seniority, the employer's action following an
economic strike upon the expiration of the contract, in recalling employees based upon departmental seniority was subject to the contractual grievance and arbitration procedure provided
for in the expired collective bargaining agreement, since it involved "a right worked for and
accumulated during the term of the contract and intended by the parties to survive contract
expirations;" the company refusal to arbitrate was an "across-the-board" refusal rather than a
case-by-case assessment of each grievance; dissent by Cracraft who concluded that the evidence did not indicate across-the-board rejection of arbitration).
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issuance of any formal complaint. Such settlements may be "out of
Board" settlements and the Agency is not a party thereto, but condones the settlement by the approval of the withdrawal of the
charge; or the settlement may be one to which the Agency is a party,
i.e., an "informal" settlement agreement or a "formal" settlement
stipulation. At times, the settlement occurs after the institution of
formal proceedings against the charged party, e.g., after issuance of
a formal complaint, during or after the hearing before the administrative law judge. The policy in favor of settlement is to minimize
federal intervention.
While these settlements, for the most part, are mutually agreed
upon by all the interested parties, including the General Counsel,
there are many occasions when a charging party, or an interested
party or the General Counsel is not in agreement with a proposed
settlement. In such cases, the question presented is whether the
Agency should enter into such a settlement with the charged party/
respondent, without the agreement of the charging party, or in another posture, whether the Board should approve a settlement entered into between the respondent and the charging party over the
opposition of the General Counsel.
Inasmuch as the NLRA is a public-interest statute and the unfair labor practice proceedings are pursued in the vindication of public rights and not private rights, one dominant rule in considering the
approval of settlement agreements is that the settlement effectuate
the policies of the Act.
Until recently, the Board would approve a settlement agreement
only if the agreement "substantially remedied" the unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint, which the Board assumed was
"meritorious and the General Counsel is prepared to carry his [or
168
her] burden of proof.'
Recently, the Board modified its policy, and will approve settlements between the charging party and the employer/union charged
with unfair labor practices over the opposition of the general counsel
without requiring that the settlement provide a full remedy as might
be issued by the Board after full litigation and success by the Gen168. Community Medical Services, Inc. d/b/a Clear Haven
N.L.R.B. 853 (1978) (vote of 3 to 2), rev'd. Independent Stave Co.
(1987). See also ADPT Transport Corp; 253 N.L.R.B. 468 (1980),
manded, National Book Consolidators Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 672 F.2d 323

Nursing Home, 236
287 N.L.R.B. No. 76
enfd. denied and re(1982). 274 N.L.R.B.

No. 181 (1985); Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties Conference Board (Arntz Contracting) 274 N.L.R.B. 1105 (1985), 277 N.L.R.B. 30 (1985).
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eral Counsel. Thus in Independent Stave Co.,1 69 the General Counsel
issued a complaint alleging that the employer had discriminatorily
refused to hire several individuals because of their union activities
with the predecessor company. In settlement, the employer and the
charging party agreed to employ the individuals and pay them 10 %
of backpay and the charging party agreed to withdraw the charge.
The General Counsel opposed the settlement on the ground that the
backpay was inadequate and the settlement did not provide for a
posting of notices to employees.
Overruling Clear Haven, under which the Board would have rejected the settlement, the Board accepted the settlement. Instead of
adhering to the previous settlement policy with its "rigid requirement that the settlement must mirror a full remedy," the Board
enunciated a new approach, giving a greater weight to the wishes of
the parties, whereby the Board
will examine all the surrounding circumstances including, but not
limited to, (1) whether the charging party(ies), the respondent(s),
and any of the individual discriminatee(s) have agreed to be bound,
and the position taken by the General Counsel regarding the settlement; (2) whether the settlement is reasonable in light of the nature of the violations alleged, and the stage of the litigation; (3)
whether there has been any fraud, coercion, or duress by any of the
parties in reaching the settlement; and (4) whether the respondent
has engaged in a history of violations of the Act or has breached
previous settlement agreements resolving unfair labor practice
disputes. 1 0

With respect to the particular settlement in the case, the Board concluded that, considering the "customary risks inherent in any litigation," and "in light of the early stage of the proceeding," the remedy
171
of reinstatement and 10% backpay was reasonable.
Another settlement area where the N.L.R.B. encountered difficulty and was the source of controversy between the Board and some
courts of appeals 172 involved the question of the entitlement of the
charging party to a hearing on its objections to a proposed unilateral
169. 287 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1987).
170. Independent Stave Co., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1987).
171. See also TNS, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (1988), on remandfrom, Oil Chemical &
Atomic Workers Union v. N.L.R.B., 806 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

172. See Leeds & Northrop Co. v. N.L.R.B., 357 F.2d 527 (3rd Cir. 1966); United
Food & Commercial Workers Union v. N.L.R.B., 788 F.2d 178 (3rd Cir. 1986), cf. Interna-

tional Ladies Garment Workers Union v. N.L.R.B., 501 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Jackman
v. N.L.R.B., 784 F.2d 759 (6th Cir. 1986); Local 282 IBT v. N.L.R.B., 339 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.
1964).
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settlement of a complaint issued by the General Counsel of the
N.L.R.B. and review of that settlement by the Board and/or the
courts. That issue was finally resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in
N.L.R.B. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local
23,113 where the Court held that such post-complaint/pre-hearing
settlements are not reviewable by the Board or the courts. "We hold
that it is a reasonable construction of the NLRA to find that until
the hearing begins, settlement or dismissal determinations are
prosecutorial" actions by the General Counsel, not adjudicatory dispositions, and as such are not subject to review.
UNION ACTIVITIES ON PRIVATE PROPERTY UNION ACCESS TO
PRIVATE PROPERTY

The clash between the rights of employees guaranteed under
Section 7 of the NLRA to "self organization, to form, join or assist
labor organizations ... and to engage in concerted activities ... and
the right to refrain" therefrom and the "unalienable" right to private
property, was inescapable.
The issue was early presented when employers promulgated
rules which attempted to limit the right of employees to engage in
union or concerted activities on the employer's property and attempts by employers to oust non-employees from their private property. The response of the U.S. Supreme Court was clear: the employer's right to private property is recognized, but, that right must,
under some circumstances, give way to the rights guaranteed under
the NLRA.
With respect to employer efforts to limit the rights of employees to engage in such activities, the Court declared:
Working time is for work. It is therefore within the province of an
employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation during working hours. It is no less true that time outside
working hours, whether before or after work, or during luncheon or
rest periods, is an employee's time to use as he wishes without unreasonable restraint, although the employee is on company property. It is therefore not within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation by an
employee outside of working hours, although on company
property." 4
173. 108 S. Ct. 413, 422 (1987).
174. Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793 (1945), See also Beth Israel
Hospital v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 483 (1978); N.L.R.B. v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., U.S. (1979);
Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
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In view of the fact that the term "working hours" normally embraces the entire period that the employee is on company property
from the beginning of work or prior thereto to the end of work, including lunch and break periods, as distinguished from "working
time" which normally covers only the time actually spent by the employee in the performance of her duties, the Board has been confronted with the legality of no-solicitation, no-distribution rules
which utilize the terms "working hours" or "working time," and
make no effort to further define those terms. The Board, as in other
matters recently, has reversed its position several times. The most
5
recent declaration is set forth in Our Way, Inc.17
A rule prohibiting solicitation during "work time" or "working
time" is presumptively valid because, absent evidence to the contrary, the term refers to periods when the employees are actually
working as distinguished from the non-work time; "on the other
hand . . . a rule prohibiting solicitation during 'working hours' is

prima facie susceptible of the interpretation that solicitation is prohibited during all business hours and, thus, invalid," unless it could
be clearly established that the term permitted solicitation during
breaktime.' 6
With respect to 'the right of non-employee union personnel to
have access to company property, the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated
that an "[a]ccommodation between the [Section 7 rights of employees and private property rights of employers] must be obtained with
as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of
1
the other."
Subsequently, the Supreme Court declared that the "locus of
that accommodation ...

may fall at differing points along the spec-

175. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1983), overruling, TRW Bearings Division, 257 N.L.R.B.
442 (1981), and reinstating the policy previously set forth in Essex International 211 N.L.R.B.

749 (1974).
176. Essex International, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 749 (1974); Our Way, supra note 175.
TRW Bearings Division, 257 N.L.R.B. 442 (1981), which was reversed by Our Way, had held

that rules which prohibited solicitation during "working hours" or "working time" are presumptively invalid, absent clarifying language, because those terms would normally be con-

strued by employees to prohibit solicitation at any time during their stay on company property,
including non-work time or break periods.

With respect to the rules relating to distribution of materials, as distinguished from oral
solicitation, see Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962); Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,
437 U.S. 556 (1978).

Other issues presented are the rights of employees who are on company property after
their tour of duty has been completed. See GTE Lenkurt, 204 N.L.R.B. 921 (1973); East Bay
Newspapers Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 1148 (1976).
177. N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
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trum depending on the nature and strength of the respective Section
7 rights and private property rights asserted in any given context."1 8
The Board was entrusted with the primary responsibility for making
the accommodation.
The U.S. Supreme Court enunciated what has been described
as the "alternative means" test, where an employer may lawfully
prohibit non-employee distribution of union literature if reasonable
efforts by the union through other available channels of communication will enable it to reach the employees with its message and if the
employer's order or notice does not discriminate against the union by
allowing other distribution." 9
After years of applying primarily the "alternative means" test
laid down by the Supreme Court in Babcock & Wilcox, although at
times, acknowledging the particular nature of the union's activities,180 the Board recently reconsidered the test to be applied in accommodating the Section 7 rights and employer property rights, first
recasting the test to shift emphasis away from the "alternative
means" test and, then two years later reversing itself and reverting
back to the "alternative means" test. Thus, in Fairmont Hotel
Co.,181 the union had a dispute with a bakery, allegedly because it
had substandard conditions for its employees; the union was not attempting to organize the bakery; the union distributed handbills at
the hotel in front of its main entrance, on private property of the
hotel, to advise the hotel customers of its dispute with the bakery
and to request the public not to patronize the hotel; the hotel directed the union to move to the public street; the union refused. In
weighing the right of a union to be on private property, the Board
(Dotson, Johansen, Babson; Stephens concurring) laid down a revised test of accommodation:
178. Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976). See also Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B.
414 (1977); Giant Food Markets, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 727 (1979); Montgomery Ward & Company, 265 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (1982).
179. N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., supra. See also Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San
Diego County Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) ("no other reasonable means of
communicating its organizational message to the employee exists").

180. See Giant Foods, supra note 178 where the Board stated: Although the [area]
standards picketing.., is dissimilar in purpose to either the organizational activity involved in
Babcock, or the primary economic picketing by the employer's employees in Hudgens, the
Board's role is the same - to accommodate the Section 7 rights of the pickets with the private
property rights of the Employer. However, as the Court pointed out in Hudgens, the locus of

accommodation of these rights may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending on
the nature and strength of the respective Section 7 rights asserted in any given context. See
also Montgomery Ward, supra note 178.
181. 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27 (1986).
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If the property owner's claim is a strong one, while the Section 7
right at issue is clearly a less compelling one, the property right
will prevail. If the property claim is a tenuous one, and the Section
7 right is clearly more compelling, then the Section 7 right will
prevail. Only in those cases where the respective claims are equal
in strength will effective means of communication become
82
determinative.1
Factors which might affect the relative strength or weakness of a

claimed property right included, "the use to which the property in
question is put; the restrictions, if any, that are imposed on public
access to the property or facility located on the property, and the
size and location of the facility." With respect to the Section 7
rights, factors which might affect the relative strength or weakness

of such rights included, "the nature of the right assorted, the purpose for which it is being asserted, the employer that is the target of
the activity, the situs of the activity, the relationship of the situs to
the target, the intended audience of the activity, and, possibly the
manner in which the right is being asserted." As an example, the
Board noted that "organizational rights and the rights to engage in
primary economic activity at the situs of a dispute may be viewed as
more compelling than handbilling and other informational activity at
locations other than the primary situs.' 18 3
Subsequent Board decisions made it clear that the formulation
of the Fairmontweighing test may have been easier than its application in particular cases.184 One of the more "unusual or difficult"
182. Id.
183. Applying the reformulated test to the Fairmont Hotel situation, the Board concluded that the property rights asserted by Fairmont were "more compelling than the Section
7 rights asserted by the Union [because] Fairmont maintains an atmosphere of formality and
decorum [at the main hotel entrance] and this area is generally open to the patrons of the
hotel. [A]II employees . . . are required to use other designated entrances;" "there is no evidence that Fairmont previously has permitted anyone to handbill or picket on its private property," "Fairmont has a valid interest in minimizing congestion, litter, and the possibility of
theft of luggage in the private area in front of the hotel's main entrance; "inasmuch as innkeepers are frequently held to a higher standard of care for their guests than many other
employers offering public facilities, Fairmont has a valid interest in limiting its tort liability."
On the other hand, the Section 7 rights asserted by the Union were of "more limited significance"; the area standards handbilling had no "vital link" to the Fairmont employees; "the
Union's activity ...was carried out at the property of an employer with which the Union had
no primary dispute, not even an area-standards one, and the employees of which stood to reap
no benefit, not even an incidental one, if the Union achieved its ultimate objective of improved
wages for the employees of [the bakery with whom the union had the area-standards dispute]". The Board concluded that "because the rights asserted by Fairmont and the Union are
not relatively equal, we deem it unnecessary to consider whether reasonable, alternative means
by which the Union could have communicated its message were available."
184. See, e.g., United Supermarkets, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 130 (1987); Browning's
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cases presented to the Board under Fairmont was the question
whether a union may picket within the corridors of a privatelyowned office building located in midtown Manhattan in New York
City. In 40-41 Realty Associates, Inc.,185 and the Union which represented a unit of 20 dental assistants, x-ray assistants, dental hygienists and clericals, after lack of success in reaching a collective
bargaining agreement with the Group Health Dental Facility went
on strike and, initially, picketed on the sidewalk outside the twentystory building in which the Dental Facility is located on the second
floor. After three weeks of such outside picketing, the union, relying
upon a court decision which had found picketing in the corridor of a
private commercial building lawful activity, 186 decided to picket in
front of the entrance to the Dental Facility offices in the corridor of
the second floor. At the request of the Dental Facility, the building
owner threatened to have the pickets arrested if they did not leave
the building. The issue thus presented was whether the union's second floor corridor picketing in support of an economic strike was
lawful, protected activity, which in turn, would render the threat of
arrest an unfair labor practice. The Board (Stephens & Babson),
applying the Fairmont balancing test, concluded that the Section 7
right and the property right asserted were equally compelling. However, the union had reasonable alternative methods to convey its
message to the intended audience other than picketing in the secondfloor corridor, e.g., picketing and handbilling at the building entrance, advising other unions providing insurance coverage to their
union members, which comprise a substantial number of the customers of the Dental Facility, that there was a strike and requesting a
Iboycott of the Dental Facility. The Board distinguished the SeattleFirst National case, on the ground that in Seattle-First National
many of the customers of the restaurant, including occupants of the
building, were "on impulse" patrons who did not decide to patronize
the restaurant until many hours after they entered the building and
saw the picketers and handbillers outside the building; whereas, in
the instant case, the "most likely inference here is that the dental
facility patients and non-striking employees came to the building intending to visit the dental facility" and were not "impulse" purchasFoodland Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 104 (1987); Greyhound Lines, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 123
(1987), Schwab Foods, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 120 (1987).
185. 288 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1988).
186. See Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. N.L.R.B. 651 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1980). The picketing occurred on the 46th floor of a 50-story office building in front of a restaurant with

whom the picketing union had a contract-negotiation dispute.
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ers of dental services and, accordingly, the union's message could be
adequately conveyed to them as they entered the building. The dissent by Member Johansen highlighted the difficulty of application of
the Fairmont rule - "Today's decision distorts and erodes an important Section 7 right - the right to strike - where alternatives to access
to an employer's premises for exercise of that right have proven unreasonable." Member Johansen dissented on the ground that this result did "not reflect the thorough consideration of both statutory and
property interest that the Supreme Court found necessary in their
proper accommodation [of Section 7 rights with private property
rights] and because it retreats from the Board's determination in
Fairmont Hotel to examine each interest fully, I dissent ... ."187
Furthermore, as the Board later acknowledged, in Jean Country
notwithstanding the plurality view of Fairmont that "alternative
means" could not be considered unless the property right and Section 7 rights were equal in strength, the great number of cases decided under Fairmont involved a finding by at least a majority of the
Board panel that one right asserted did not clearly outweigh the
other, and, therefore, it was necessary to examine the availability of
reasonable alternative means in those cases.""
Accordingly, upon further consideration, the Board (newly constituted, Stephens, Johansen, Cracraft and Higgins) "conclude[d]
that the availability of reasonable alternative means is a factor that
must be considered in every access case." '
[W]e cannot conclude that we should ever refrain from making
any inquiry at all into whether a denial of access will entirely preclude the exercise of a Section 7 right or whether access is totally
unnecessary to the exercise of the right. . . . [T]he General Counsel bears the initial burden on the alternative means factor, i.e .,..
the General Counsel must show that without access to the property, those seeking to exercise the right in question have no reasonable means of communicating with the audience that exercise of
that right entails. 190
The Board noted that "generally it will be the exceptional case
where the use of newspapers, radio and television will be feasible
alternatives to direct contact;" factors that may be relevant to the
assessment of alternative means include "the desirability of avoiding
187.
188.
189.
190.

See supra note 181.
291 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (1988), slip op. at 3, note 2 and cases cited therein.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
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the enmeshment of neutrals in labor disputes, the safety of attempting communications at alternative public sites, the burden and expense of nontrespassory communication alternatives, and the extent
to which exclusive use of the alternatives would dilute the effectiveness of the message."191
An interesting side issue involving union activity and private
rights is the propriety of picketing by a union at the private home of
an employer or its agents or other comparable "private" location in
connection with an otherwise lawful dispute between the union and
the employer.
Section 8(b)(1)(B) prohibits a labor organization from restraining or coercing "an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or the adjustment of
grievances." Such conduct is prohibited if it has the effect of restraining the employer's choice of a representative, even if the result
was not intended,192 and proscribes any union pressure which "may
adversely affect" an employer representative's performance of his or
her protected duties.1 "'
In United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
Local 1098194 the union picketed the home of the employer's general
manager, who was in charge of labor relations, and the home of the
employer's majority stockholder. The Board concluded that peaceful
picketing of such homes in support of a lawful economic objective
was not unlawful under the NLRA. In reaching that conclusion, the
Board noted that the picket signs named only the employer and its
dispute with the union; the wording of the picket signs supported a
lawful economic objective; the picketing involved no misconduct;
there was no threats or violence; and the picketing occurred during
normal working hours.
However, in early 1988, the General Counsel of the N.L.R.B.
concluded that, under certain circumstances, a union's picketing of
the home of one of the employer's negotiators and the business office
of the negotiator's spouse was unlawful and warranted the issuance
of a complaint. The circumstances of that case were: Upon the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the employees engaged
191. Id. at 7-9.
192. N.L.R.B. v. Electrical Workers Local 323, 703 F.2d 501 (11th Cir. 1983) cert.
denied International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local, 323 v. N.L.R.B., 464 U.S. 950
(1983). Teamsters Local 856 (L. Lion & Sons Co., Inc.) 195 N.L.R.B. 971 (1972).
193. American Broadcasting Co. v. Writer's Guild of America, West, Inc. 437 U.S. 411,
429 (1978); Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 417 U.S. 78 (1974); cf. N.L.R.B. v. Local
340 IBEW, 107 S. Ct. 2002 (1987).
194. 280 N.L.R.B. No. 102 (1986).
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in a strike for four months. After the strike, the parties continued to
bargain and the union picketed the home of the employer's Manager
of Industrial Relations who was involved in the contract negotiations
and grievance processing. Picketing was conducted by from one to
fourteen pickets, during mornings, afternoons and late evenings; on
one occasion the pickets were outside the home from 12:30 a.m. to
2:30 a.m. Some picket signs specifically named the Manager as well
as the Employer; the picket signs labelled the manager as unfair, as
holding the union hostage and asked whether the Employer's bargaining proposal which sought benefit reductions was the Manager's
own plan. On one occasion during the picketing the Manager's home
was struck by two paint bombs from an unknown source. The Manager's wife worked as a real estate agent in an office located in a
shopping mall; on at least two occasions, the union picketed the
shopping mall driveway entrance with signs similar to those used at
the Manager's home.
The General Counsel concluded that, unlike the picketing in
Womack, the union's picketing, in the case under consideration,
tended to have the effect of coercing the manager in the performance
of his duties as the Employer's bargaining representative and the
picketing had the foreseeable effect of causing the manager to alter
his position during negotiations or causing him to remove himself as
the employer's negotiator. The General Counsel distinguished the
case from Womack in that the picketing at home occurred beyond
normal working hours, the language on the picket signs attacked the
manager by name, portrayed him as a stumbling block to reaching
an agreement, held him up to "obloguy and scorn," the union's picketing was attended by vandalism even though not attributed to the
union or pickets, and the union also picketed the business office of
the wife although there was no relationship between that business
and the employer.
In a similar vein, the U.S. Supreme Court recently considered
the issues of picketing at a private home in the context of the constitutionality of a local statute which banned picketing in front of private homes. By a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the picketing law and concluded it did not violate the First Amendment
because it was a limited one, banning picketing "before or about the
residence of any individual," but allowing other protests like
marches and door-to-door leafletting. The ordinance leaves open am195
ple alternative channels of communication and is content-neutral.
195.

Frizby v. Schultz 103 S. Ct. 2495 (1988). The picketing in the case before the
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CONCLUSION

The history of labor relations in the United States, both before
and after the enactment of the NLRA, demonstrates, on the one
hand, its adversarial nature, and, on the other hand, the ability of
employers and unions to put aside their adversarial roles and work
out their problems amicably to their mutual satisfaction and for the
common good. Regulation of labor relations by the NLRA, despite
the attacks from both sides of the bargaining table, has proven a
viable method for the resolution of disputes between employers, unions and employees. Regulation under the NLRA has been valuable
in limiting the swing of the labor-management relations pendulum
and, when necessary, to attempt to minimize the arc of the pendulum. As indicated previously, the decisional process of the Board
may be regarded as manifestations of de facto, if not de jure, deregulation. We have noted that there have been calls, over the years, for
deregulation of labor relations by outright repeal of the NLRA or by
substantial modification or withdrawal of some of the powers and
authority of the NLRA.
Concurrent with those suggestions for deregulation has been the
emergence of entirely different forms of "deregulation" - a call for
labor-management cooperation, a call for employers and unions to
work together. 96
The polarization of years gone by has lessened in recent years
with a growing awareness by both sides that mutual respect and understanding may serve their needs better and a joint effort may be
essential to counter the common assault upon their mutual interest.
The current trend in labor relations is in the direction of efforts to
mitigate the confrontational and adversarial nature of the employerunion relationship by attempting to make the employee a participant
Court involved picketing of a doctor's home by a group of anti-abortion activists. However, the
decision may affect the tactics of a labor organization in labor disputes with employers as

discussed herein.
196. See Schlossberg and Fetter, U.S. Labor Law and the Futureof Labor Management
Cooperation, 3 Lab. Lawyer 595 (1986). A.H. Raskin, Organized Labor - A Movement In
Search of a Missiorn Implicationsfor Employees and Unions 3 Lab. Lawyer 39 (1986). These
two articles provide excellent analyses and insights on the developing labor management cooperation programs; See also Fetter and Reynolds, Labor-Management Cooperation and the
Law: Perspectivesfrom Year Two of the Laws Project 23 Harv. L.R. - L.L. REv. 3 (1988);
Klare, The Labor-ManagementCooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective. 23
Harv. L.R. - L.L. Rev. 39 (1988); Smith & Childs, Imported From America: Cooperative
Labor Relations at New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc., 9 Indus. Rel. L.J. 70 (1987);
H.H. Perritt, Jr., Aspects of Labor Law that Affect Labor Management Cooperation in the
Railroad and Airline Industries, a report prepared for the Bureau of Labor Management
Relations and Cooperative Programs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, February 15, 1988.
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in the entrepreneurial process of the employer, by having the employee share in the decision making process as well as the actual
production process and by making the total relationship a sharing
experience. The methods or programs to achieve these results vary
and, as can be anticipated, are not totally acceptable to all. Some
favor Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP");'97 others favor labor-management co-operative programs, variously referred to as
quality of work-life, employment involvement, joint production
teams, worker participation, labor-management participation teams
or committees. The employee ownership of Avis is an example of one
approach. The UAW and GM-Toyota joint venture at New United
Motors Manufacturing, Inc., in Fremont, California, the Employment Involvement Program ("EI") agreed upon by Ford Motor
Company and the UAW, the Saturn agreement between GM and
UAW are examples of the cooperative approach to labor relations.1 18
Who would have thought that a high union official, by mutual
agreement, would sit on the Board of Directors of a corporation with
which the union has a collective bargaining contract? Douglas Fraser of the UAW sat on the Board of Directors of General Motors.
By whatever name, these efforts constitute a new approach to
new problems.
[A]fter years of adversarial relations, many employers and unions
have come to the realization that they can no longer ignore the real
and persistent challenges from overseas and domestic competition
and from technological change. In order to meet the demands of
this more difficult environment, they have decided to abandon
traditional confrontational attitudes to try to work together to increase productivity and quality for the company and improve the
quality of work life for the employees. 99
The federal government has actively supported these labor management cooperative programs. The U.S. Department of Labor has
established a Bureau of Labor Management Relations and Cooperative Programs. A study, known as "The Laws Project" of "The Labor Laws Project," has been undertaken by the Department to assess
the feasability and ramifications of such programs under the current
197. ESOP is a device to facilitate employees' (generally collectively bargained but in
some cases not collectively bargained) participation in the ownership of the company sponsoring the plan. The concept is that a plan borrows money from a bank or another type of lender
and uses that money to purchase the shares of the employer. Depending on the percentage of
shares purchased, ESOPs can exercise tremendous influence in the operations of the employer.
198. See supra note 194.
199. Schlossberg & Fetter, at 17.
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state of labor laws and current collective bargaining."'
Some of these cooperative programs do not fit within the accepted concepts of labor-management relations and, indeed, at times
seem to conflict with existing legal dogma and current labor laws.
Serious questions have been posed as to the legality of those efforts.
Do these plans constitute a form of "company unionism" and assistance condemned by'the NLRA? Can union officials' participation
in managerial decisions as part of the joint team result in a breach of
the duty of fair representation? Can payments by the employer to
the union official in his capacity as a member of the joint team be a
criminal violation of the Taft-Hartley Act? "These difficult issues
and the manner in which they are handled will be crucial in setting
the tone of U.S. labor relations. 2 °1
It is clear that labor relations in the United States is subject to
detailed regulation and will continue, notwithstanding economic deregulation or changes under the NLRA. And to those who would
deregulate labor relations by repealing the NLRA or alter it radically to put the parties back to where they were prior to regulation
under the National Labor Relations Act (and the Norris-La Guardia
Act and the Railway Labor Act), I would suggest a review of the
history of labor relations in the United States. It has been stated
that "[tihe United States has had the bloodiest and most violent labor history of any industrial nation in the world. 20 2 Regulation and
federal intervention has brought positive actions and contributions by
both labor and management, accommodations, cooperation and
agreements by the parties which has established a basically sound
system of labor relations and collective bargaining. So, added to that
statement, I suggest, should be the phrase "and yet it is the best
system of collective bargaining in the world," with due respect to our
British colleagues.
One final observation on the subject of labor relations in the
United States under the NLRA and deregulation "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat
it."

20 3

200. See supra note 194.
201. Schlossberg & Fetter, at 38.
202. Taft and Ross, American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Characterand Outcome, included in Violence in America, Report to the National Commission on the Cause and Prevention of Violence in America, June 1969, a Presidential Commission established pursuant to
Executive Orders Nos. 11412 and 11469.
203. George Santayana, Reason in Society (emphasis added).
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